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Brown Takes Over as Air Force Chief of Staff

Air Force Magazine, 6 Aug 20

John A. Tirpak

Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. officially took the reins as Chief of Staff of the Air Force in an Aug. 6 ceremony marking the transition of leadership from retiring Gen. David L. Goldfein.

Against a backdrop of modern jets and a World War II-era P-51 in a hangar at Joint Base Andrews, Md., Brown pledged to build on Goldfein's top three priorities: Empowering squadrons, building the Air Force's place in the joint force, and developing joint all-domain command and control.

He will oversee nearly 700,000 Airmen and work alongside Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond as the Space Force stands up within the Department of the Air Force.

"We must no longer defer, but must accelerate the needed change and tough choices we've often discussed," while empowering Airmen and improving their quality of life, Brown said. Those challenges, from addressing racism to building the future aircraft fleet, will be "difficult, but not impossible" to meet.

He has also raised the idea that it's time to rethink how the military splits up its roles and missions, which could lead to notable changes during his tenure.

Brown, the first African American officer to lead a U.S. military service, thanked his family and the Black Air Force leaders who preceded him, such as the Tuskegee Airmen; Gen. Daniel James Jr., special assistant to the Air Force chief of staff in the 1970s; and Edward J. Dwight, the first Black man who trained as an astronaut. While retired Army Gen. Colin Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he never led a military service.

"I'm in awe that I'm even standing here as the 22nd Air Force Chief of Staff, considering I'd only planned to stay in the Air Force four years, and I almost quit ROTC after the first semester," Brown said.

"You can expect my leadership to be framed by the same four tenets I've used throughout my career: execute at a high standard, be disciplined in execution, pay attention to details, and have fun," he added.

He returns to the Pentagon from Pacific Air Forces, where he managed resources for air combat operations in the vast Indo-Pacific. Maintaining a strong U.S. presence in the region is a top priority of the current National Defense Strategy.

Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper recounted Brown's long string of combat assignments in key hot spots around the world—the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific—as well as his time running the Air Force Weapons School. The new chief "masterfully orchestrated and led the air war against

the Islamic State,” and is “humble, approachable, and credible,” Esper said.

Esper and Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised Brown as a leader who has made the military a more ready, stronger partner in combat theaters around the world.

“In C.Q., we have all that is good about America,” Milley said. The leadership change is “really about an idea that’s worth defending. ... Under the stars and stripes, we are all Americans.”

Meanwhile, Goldfein will retire to San Antonio, Texas, after nearly 40 years in the military and four as CSAF.

Air Force Secretary Barbara M. Barrett paid tribute to Goldfein’s exceptional career as an Airman, recounting the heroics that led to his two Distinguished Flying Crosses. After being shot down, evading capture, and getting rescued in the Balkans in 1999, Goldfein flew a mission “the very next night,” Barrett said. Among the aircraft in the hangar were an F-16 like Goldfein’s, and an HH-60G Pave Hawk rescue helicopter to commemorate those who rescued him.

“Dave Goldfein is an extraordinary warrior,” Barrett said. She noted many individual stories of his help and encouragement to Airmen, and his persistence in obtaining a posthumous Medal of Honor for MSgt. John Chapman.

“He has said that what is best for the joint force is best for the Air Force,” Barrett observed. “Among his legacies are squadron revitalization; force modernization; the B-21 Raider, data management digitization; monumental groundwork behind the Space Force, and the ever-present JADC2,” which Goldfein championed among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Barrett did not mention the selection of the T-7A Red Hawk trainer jet as another modernization milestone on Goldfein’s watch, but one of the first examples of the plane was in the hangar alongside an F-35A Joint Strike Fighter.

Milley paid tribute to Goldfein’s character, saying he “never backs down from truth to power” and stays cool under pressure. Goldfein is the “most professional officer” he has ever encountered, Milley said.

Esper also thanked Goldfein and his family for their “unfailing devotion” to the nation over his 37-year career.

Goldfein led “the most advanced, the most capable, and the most lethal Air Force in the world and in history,” Esper said, “pushing a budget of nearly \$700 billion” over five years to support global combat operations and advance personnel and research initiatives.

Goldfein was the right officer to shift the focus of the Air Force to great power competition when the new National Defense Strategy rolled out in 2018, Esper said, and the service is stronger because of his leadership.

Goldfein thanked his wife Dawn, his family, mentors, and all Air Force members and civilians, calling the running of the service “the ultimate team

contact sport.” He urged the Air Force to stay ahead of change, quoting Italian airpower visionary Giulio Douhet as saying, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”

Brown is a true warrior, leader, and friend, Goldfein said: “The future of the Air Force has never been brighter.”

The ceremony was followed by A-10, F-16, F-22, and P-51 flyovers as well as a performance by the Thunderbirds aerial demonstration team. The flight line also featured a B-52 and B-2 stealth bomber on static display, along with C-17 and KC-135 tanker aircraft.

341st Missile Wing Change of Command

341st Missile Wing Public Affairs, Aug. 6 | Devin Doskey

MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, Mont. -- Malmstrom Air Force Base welcomed Col. Anita Feugate Opperman as the new commander of the 341st Missile Wing during a change of command ceremony Aug. 5, 2020, at Malmstrom AFB, Mont. Feugate Opperman takes command after serving as the director of the Security Sector Reform Group at the Office of Security Cooperation at the US Embassy at Baghdad, Iraq.

STRATCOM Commander: Number of SSBNs Needed Depends on Threat

Seapower Magazine Online, July 31 | Richard R. Burgess

ARLINGTON, Va. -- The U.S. Navy is planning to build 12 Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace its 14 legacy Ohio-class SSBNs, but the number could change if the threat to the United States changes.

With the increasing concern about the growing power of China and Russia in the era of “great power competition,” the numbers in the U.S. nuclear deterrence triad — Navy SSBNs and U.S. Air Force bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles — might need to be changed to meet the future threat.

Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, speaking July 30 at a webinar sponsored by the Mitchell Institute, said that the U.S. strategic deterrent is “going to be tested in ways that it hasn’t been tested before,” noting that “it has been 30 years since the United States contemplated a nuclear conflict.”

Richard noted that Russia has been modernizing its forces for the last 15 years and that there has been a “breathtaking expansion” in China’s forces.

“China is on a trajectory to be a peer to us by the end of the decade,” he said.

The admiral praised the U.S. nuclear deterrent triad because of the “flexibility of its design,” which allows U.S. Strategic Command to respond to every contingency.

“If you take away any leg [of the triad], you just took away a stack of attributes that we have found useful in that past and see being useful in the future,” he said. “Can I compensate in some respects by coming across and using other elements of the triad? Yes, but not with those same attributes. Which means you just narrowed the range of the situations that we are able to effectively deter. You just took away a future hedging capability. If you took a piece [of the triad] away, that’s going to make it that much harder for me to execute the policy of this nation as documented in the Nuclear Posture Review.”

Richard addressed the survivability of the SSBN leg of the triad, armed with Trident missiles.

“When we say the submarine leg is survivable, that’s not just based on individual platform survivability,” he said. “Submarines are very difficult to find. They are not impossible to find. They have to be operated correctly like any stealth platform. But you derive that from force survivability. It is the combination of the number and location and the way you are operating the force is what gives you that very high confidence that that leg is going to survive.”

“I’m very confident that the Navy has taken the right steps to ensure that we are able to maintain force survivability,” Richard continued. “I think it’s important that when we set the requirements, particularly the numbers for the platforms, that was based on a specific threat. If you change the threat on me, then we have to come back and re-think what the right number is. That’s going up. Going down, it’s not just what the threat looks like, but it’s what it takes to maintain that attribute of the leg. There’s a minimum number of submarines you can get to. It doesn’t matter what number of weapons or missiles are on them, it’s the number of platforms I have to have to make my statement remain true on force survivability. That is why the Navy and the STRATCOM will say ‘at least 12’ [Columbia-class SSBNs]. We need to see what the threat looks like.”

Richard praised the introduction of the low-yield W76-2 nuclear warhead into the deterrent force. “It is a very welcome addition,” he said. “It is doing exactly what it was designed to do, but it is important to remember it added into an already existing stack of capabilities.”

He also noted that the Nuclear Posture Review “wisely talked about a sea-launched [nuclear] cruise missile ... a very good beginning to offset the numbers of non-treaty-accountable weapons that has great benefit in the assurance of our allies.”

U.S. Strategic Command now analyzes daily deterrence risks for all combatant commands

Defense News Online, July 31 | Aaron Mehta

WASHINGTON -- In the last six months, U.S. Strategic Command has begun performing daily analysis on the state of nuclear deterrence in each of the regional combatant commands, STRATCOM commander Adm. Charles Richard said Thursday.

Richard described the “risk of strategic deterrence failure” effort as a “new type of analysis” that allows STRATCOM to present, on a day-by-day basis, “a formal estimate of the risks that deterrence is going to fail” around the globe.

“I acknowledge this is an analytic process getting after something that is fundamentally subjective,” Richard said at an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute. “But the assertion here is, this risk carries so much consequence that I need to be able to describe to the [defense] secretary and the

chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] at all times, under all conditions, what risks we're taking with regard to deterrence failing, and then inside that, nuclear deterrence failing."

The new analysis pulls in information from the Joint Staff and other combatant commands. Richard said the threat of deterrence failure is "currently low."

"We have some great formal mechanisms with all the combatant commands to pull in what they see and what they're doing, put it into my best possible emulation of the other guy's decision calculus, and then be able to provide the department: 'All right, here's where we sit. Here's the risk, here's the margin,'" Richard explained.

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, who leads the Mitchell Institute, said the day-to-day assessment design described by Richard is "unique" and could have great value.

"He is applying an outcome-oriented assessment to strategic deterrence that may have been implied in the past, but he is making a concerted effort to identify the impact of strategic deterrence in a much more qualitative and quantitative fashion," Deptula said.

"'Deterrence' is challenging to quantify, but by committing to assessing the impact of deterrent effects," Richard is creating a more deliberate process, Deptula added. "I really think he is establishing a process of how to best determine the impact of actions that STRATCOM is taking in the decisions that it is making."

Richard also stressed that defining deterrence in 2020 can be difficult, noting that "strategic deterrence is more than just nuclear deterrence, particularly now, today. It is non-kinetic space, cyber; it is your conventional piece of this."

"All of this has to be integrated together. It's not just a STRATCOM job, it is all combatant commands. And we have to be able to rethink the way we do business," he said. "We're going to have to change the way we think about deterrence."

One of the commands providing daily input is U.S. Space Command, which, until its creation as a standalone command, fell under STRATCOM's purview.

Richard described the relationship between the two as "closely coupled," noting that SPACECOM still has a major role in ensuring nuclear command and control, and that STRATCOM continues to handle some bureaucratic functions for the newest command.

U.S. ambassador says Iran is world No. 1 sponsor of terrorism

Associated Press, Aug. 6 | Edith M. Lederer

UNITED NATIONS -- The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations called Iran “the world’s number one sponsor of terrorism” on Thursday and warned Russia and China that they will become “co-sponsors” if they block a resolution to extend the U.N. arms embargo on Iran.

Ambassador Kelly Craft said the United States hopes Russia and China “will not be co-sponsors of the number one state that sponsors terrorism” and “will see the importance of peace in the Middle East.”

But she said the partnership between Russia and China, not only on backing Iran, is very clear: “They’re just going to be promoting chaos, conflict and mayhem outside their borders, so we have to just corner them.”

Craft and Brian Hook, the top U.S. envoy for Iran, briefed a group of reporters following Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement Wednesday that the United States will call for a Security Council vote next week on a U.S.-drafted resolution to extend indefinitely the arms embargo that is due to expire Oct. 18. Hook announced hours later he is stepping down from the post.

The foreign ministers of Russia and China in separate letters to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Security Council last month were sharply critical of the U.S. effort, and gave every indication they would veto the resolution if it gets the minimum nine “yes” votes in the 15-member council, which appears unlikely.

If the vote fails, Pompeo suggested the U.S. would invoke the “snapback” mechanism that would restore all U.N. sanctions on Iran. Snapback was envisioned in the 2015 nuclear deal in the event Iran was proven to be in violation of the accord, under which it received billions of dollars in sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the Trump administration of unleashing a politically motivated campaign against Iran and called for “universal condemnation” of the U.S. attempt to impose a permanent arms embargo on the Islamic Republic.

He said President Donald Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and six major powers and now has no legal right to try to use the U.N. resolution endorsing the deal to indefinitely continue the embargo.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the arms embargo should be lifted Oct. 18. He also referred to the “snapback” provision, saying that since the U.S. is no longer a party to the nuclear deal it “has no right to demand the Security Council to activate the rapid reinstatement of sanctions mechanism.”

The vote on the U.S.-drafted resolution, which could come as early as Monday, and its expected defeat will set the stage for a potential crisis at the Security Council amid rising tensions in the Middle East and the U.S. determination to maintain the U.N. arms embargo.

The five remaining parties to the 2015 nuclear deal — Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany — are determined to maintain it, and are very concerned that extending the arms embargo would lead to Iran’s exit from the agreement and its speeded-up pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Hook, the U.S. envoy, said Iran has not been cooperating with the U.N. nuclear agency for a year and “there isn’t some acceptable level of non-compliance that we will accept out of fear that they’ll do something worse.”

“That is by definition nuclear blackmail,” he said. “We just don’t follow that playbook.”

Hook said Iran has been able to move a lot of weapons “in the dark” to proxies in the Middle East despite the arms embargo so “imagine what they will be able to accomplish in broad daylight.”

One NNSA, But Keep Your Branding, If You Like It, Administrator Says

ExchangeMonitor.com, July 31 | Not Attributed

There is just one National Nuclear Security Administration, but it has numerous locations with their own ways of doing business, the administrator of the semiautonomous Department of Energy nuclear-weapons agency told an advisory group this week.

The 16-member Secretary of Energy Advisory Board was chartered in 2018 to provide independent advice to the secretary of energy from a mixture of business leaders and former public servants. One of the big themes of Tuesday’s meeting was DOE’s brand, and how to burnish it for the public.

Nuclear weapons programs, famously born secret, don’t necessarily seek the spotlight

“Most Americans won’t even know what we do,” Gordon-Hagerty told the board.

Still, she touted the agency’s “one-NNSA initiative,” published in December 2018. Equal parts slogan and management philosophy, the initiative calls on the agency’s eight sometimes-competitive sites to “work with a single purpose as ... through more effective teaming and improved mission integration.”

Practically speaking, that might include keeping a director of one of the NNSA national laboratories on message if she or he visits with congressional representatives to lobby for her or his site, Gordon-Hagerty said Tuesday.

“I’m of the opinion that if a lab director wants to speak with his local congressman or senator, or he or she is on the Hill, I think that’s a wonderful thing,” Gordon-Hagerty said. “Never would we stop anyone from speaking to a congressman or a senator or anything like that, but we have an incredibly important mission [and it] will serve us better if we do it [with] an integrated approach.”

Still, there are limits to any top-downing NNSA is willing to do from headquarters.

“While we are one NNSA, we also have eight very unique brands,” Gordon-Hagerty said, referring to NNSA labs, production sites, and the Nevada National Security Site. “And we are absolutely wedded to ensuring that they retain that unique signature and brand that is their own.”

Guided by National Defense Strategy, Defense Department Increases Force Lethality

<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2300576/guided-by-national-defense-strategy-defense-department-increases-force-lethality/>

From the DoD // AUG. 5, 2020

The best way the United States can avoid war is for everyone to know it would win.

That means having the best, most modern equipment, a highly trained, ready, and well-organized force, and a demonstrated ability to rapidly deploy anywhere, across all domains, to defend its interests and to help defend the interests of allies and partners. The U.S. military must be the most lethal combat force on the planet. Building a more lethal force is one of three lines of effort central to the [National Defense Strategy](#) laid out in 2018. It's something Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper has been focused on since he took office last year.

Esper said the department must modernize the force, to include investing in "game-changing" technologies to transition from a legacy military to a capable force of the future. "This will allow us to maintain our long-held battlefield overmatch, which is more important than ever, as China and Russia continue to modernize their militaries and pursue advantages in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G," Esper said.

In the last year, the department has also requested the largest research and development budget in its history, and has secured funding for its 11 modernization initiatives, including hypersonics and artificial intelligence. Within [hypersonics](#), the department is accelerating development of weapons with plans to start fielding systems in 2023. The department has also ramped up flight testing of hypersonic systems with 40 tests planned in the next five years.

On the [AI](#) front, the department is accelerating the fielding of AI capabilities to meet warfighter needs through the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. The department also announced its "AI Ethics Principles" to ensure the U.S. is the global leader in the responsible development and use of AI.

Also a priority is the modernization of all three legs of the [nuclear triad](#), including air-launched systems, ground-based systems and sea-launched systems. Coupled with that is modernization of the nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure. Over the past year, the department has fielded the new W76-2 submarine-launched, low-yield ballistic missile warhead. The department is also now developing next-generation interceptor and ballistic missile defense systems to keep pace with adversary missile systems and ensure layered defense of the homeland.

In [cyber](#), a relatively new domain, U.S. Cyber Command is supporting the department's "defend forward" strategy. This ensures the U.S. is persistently engaged with cyber actors to defeat them online, improve the lethality of combatant commands, and support a whole-of-government effort to deliver a safe, secure and legitimate election. [Space](#), an even newer domain, has received a boost as well since Esper took office. In December, the department stood up the U.S. Space Force, an entirely new military service under the Department of the Air Force. Earlier in 2019, the department also stood up U.S. Space Command. With both of these new activations, the department recognizes the growing importance of space as a warfighting domain.

Airmen on Navy Command Jet Test-Launch Three-Tipped, Unarmed Nuclear Missile

https://www.airforcemag.com/navy-command-jet-test-launches-three-tipped-unarmed-nuclear-missile/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DEF%20EBB%208.5.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief

By Brian W. Everstine for Air Force Magazine // Aug. 4, 2020

Air Force missileers aboard a Navy E-6B Mercury nuclear command plane launched a three-tipped, unarmed Air Force nuclear missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., in an unusual but long-planned exercise Aug. 4.

Sailors and Airmen from Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., aboard the E-6B worked with Airmen from Vandenberg who acted as the alert and operational crews on the ground for launch night. At 12:21 a.m. local time, the missile and its three test re-entry vehicles—which would carry the nuclear warhead in a real launch—left California and flew for about 30 minutes to splash down 4,200 miles away at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

“The flight test program demonstrates one part of the operational capability of the ICBM weapon system,” Col. Omar Colbert, commander of the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg, said in an Aug. 4 release. “The Minuteman III is 50 years old, and continued test launches are essential in ensuring its reliability until the 2030s when the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent is fully in place. Most importantly, this visible message of national security serves to assure our allies and dissuade potential aggressors.”

Air Force Global Strike Command vets the 1970s-era unarmed missiles a few times a year to ensure they are still accurate and reliable. This is the second test launch of a dummy Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile in 2020. Vandenberg held its first test launch of the year in February, when the base offered reporters a rare peek into launch-night operations.

The test is notable because Global Strike does not often test missiles configured with multiple re-entry vehicles, which were phased out to comply with the New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia. The command did not immediately answer why the exercise featured a multi-tipped weapon. The Air Force last tested an ICBM with three re-entry vehicles in April 2018, *The Drive* reported.

The service said the test, previewed in an April press release, is not responding to any real-world events or regional tensions. Global Strike’s launch calendars are planned three to five years in advance. Airmen from the 90th Missile Wing at F.E Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., were originally

chosen to support the launch, but could not travel because of restrictions in place during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The missile itself came from F.E. Warren and was maintained by the 90th Maintenance Group.

The pandemic posed an opportunity to instead vet the E-6B, one of the military's aircraft that can give the order to fire nuclear weapons in case underground launch control centers are destroyed. The Pentagon is preparing to replace the E-6B and the Air Force's E-4B "Doomsday" plane with an "optimized fleet" dubbed the Survivable Airborne Operations Center.

The flying emergency command centers occasionally participate in the tests to check how well they can talk to and direct the ICBM fleet, as well as to see whether upgrades are working. "Even during the pandemic, Air Force Global Strike Command maintains various levels of redundant capability to assure a national deterrent," the service said. Editor's Note: This story was updated at 10:30 a.m. on Aug. 5 to correct the home base of the 90th Missile Wing.

News & Opinion

Ford, Bush presidential adviser Brent Scowcroft dies at 95

By Douglass K. Daniel - Associated Press - Friday, August 7, 2020

WASHINGTON (AP) — Brent Scowcroft, who played a prominent role in American foreign policy as national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush and was a Republican voice against the 2003 invasion of Iraq, has died. He was 95.

Scowcroft died Thursday of natural causes at his home in Falls Church, Virginia, Bush spokesperson Jim McGrath said.

Scowcroft was the only person to serve as national security adviser to two different administrations. His appointment by Ford in 1975 came as Scowcroft retired from the Air Force with the rank of lieutenant general. He advised Bush, by then a close friend, during the four years of the Bush administration, 1989-93.

In a study of Scowcroft's career, historian David F. Schmitz noted that Scowcroft had been at the center of numerous post-Vietnam War discussions of American foreign policy. He was part of the presidential administrations that grappled with U.S. responses to the collapse of communism in Europe, the crackdown in China after the Tiananmen Square protests, and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War.

“The key tenets of his thinking, shaped by the Second World War, were that national security policy had to protect the nation from aggression, provide international stability, control arms while maintaining preparedness, and shape an international environment that was conducive to America's goals and needs,” Schmitz wrote.

Described as both gentle and tough, a brilliant coordinator most concerned with results, a tireless worker used to 18-hour days, Scowcroft offered a self-assessment to The Washington Post on the eve of the George H.W. Bush administration: “I don't have a quick, innovative mind. I don't automatically think of good, new ideas. What I do better is pick out good ideas from bad ideas. ... It is comforting to be doing things that make a difference. In the end, it's the job that's more important.”

Scowcroft was born March 19, 1925, in Ogden, Utah, where his father owned a wholesale grocery business. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1947 and then joined the Army Air Corps, which soon became the Air Force. Only a few months after completing pilot training, he broke his back in the crash of an F-51, which put him in the hospital for two years.

America's atomic bombing of Nagasaki: Lessons forgotten

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/aug/5/americas-atomic-bombing-of-nagasaki-lessons-forgot/>

Second atomic bombing of Japan underscores U.S. determination to use full nuclear might to achieve victory

By Dr. Peter Vincent Pry - - Wednesday, August 5, 2020

75 years ago, August 6, 1945, an A-bomb destroyed Hiroshima. Three day later, August 9, 1945, a second A-bomb obliterated Nagasaki.

The atomic bombing anniversary has become a time for public debate. Since publication of John Hershey's Pulitzer prize-winning book "Hiroshima" (1946) the first atomic bombing has become synonymous for both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima has even become a new word in English and other languages for describing any catastrophe, especially catastrophes of great magnitude and inhumanity.

Overwhelmingly, academic and media opinion use Hiroshima to make emotionally charged condemnations of America and hysterical appeals to "ban the bomb." Strategic realists and most military historians disagree with the above:

- Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II, the most destructive war in history costing 60 million lives.
- War with or without nuclear weapons is horrific and inhumane, like the March 1945 incendiary bombing of Tokyo, designed to cause a massive firestorm that burned to death more people than died at Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
- The atomic bombings spared one million U.S. and several million Japanese casualties that probably would have resulted from invading Japan's home islands.
- Nuclear deterrence enabled the U.S. to defeat the USSR in the Cold War, peacefully, without a thermonuclear World War III, and has deterred recurrence of another great war, so far.

However, both sides of the great debate over the wisdom of nuclear weapons and the long-term efficacy of nuclear deterrence should pay more attention to Nagasaki. Nagasaki, the second atomic bombing, was not identical to Hiroshima, and has its own important lessons for Mankind. Nagasaki, technologically and strategically, was more important than Hiroshima.

Technologically, the Hiroshima "**Little Boy**" A-bomb was a simple gun-type uranium-fueled design that was a technological dead end. The Nagasaki "**Fat Man**" A-bomb was a much more sophisticated implosion-type plutonium-fueled design that opened the "Pandora's Box" to more powerful weapons, including H-bombs. Strategically, the Nagasaki A-bomb was an early entrant in nuclear arms racing between nations, and between competing U.S. scientists, developed by a rival design team that technologically eclipsed the much less sophisticated Hiroshima A-bomb.

Why develop two different A-bombs? --- To make sure one of the A-bombs would work. To make sure the U.S. would beat Nazi Germany to the A-bomb. We did not know it at the time, but the U.S. was also in an atomic arms race with Japan, as Tokyo was also working on the bomb. (See Robert Wilcox, "Japan's Secret War" 1995.) The technological and strategic dynamics that produced the Nagasaki A-bomb set the pattern for nuclear arms racing between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War.

The decades-long Cold War struggle to deter, or prevail in, nuclear war resulted in arms racing by both sides to gain advantage, or cancel technological advantage by the other side, producing ever more powerful nuclear weapons; specialized tactical nuclear weapons for battles on land, sea, and air; and bombers, intercontinental missiles, missile submarines and other means for delivering nuclear strikes.

As noted above, the U.S. eventually won the Cold War, prevailing over the USSR peacefully by achieving first superiority, and later maintaining parity, in the nuclear balance. Thus, the lesson from both World War II and the Cold War nuclear competition is to be sure not to lose. Do not let the other side gain a potentially decisive nuclear advantage if you want to survive—and win.

Unfortunately, Washington has forgotten the nuclear lessons of World War II and the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has so neglected its nuclear deterrent and fallen so far behind potential adversaries that the U.S. may never catch-up. For example:

- Russian nuclear forces command an at least 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons and 3-to-1 advantage in nuclear weapons overall (strategic and tactical).
- Russia has technologically new types of advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems that have no counterparts in the U.S.
- U.S. modernization plans for bombers, ICBMs, and missile submarines and their nuclear weapons will not be accomplished for decades.

U.S. Cold War consensus on maintaining nuclear parity, yielding no nuclear advantage to potential adversaries, is broken. Many Democrat leaders agree with radical anti-nuclear activists that the U.S. should lead the way toward “banning the bomb” by reducing nuclear weapons to a minimum deterrent unilaterally. 2020, in addition to being 75 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is the 80th anniversary of the Fall of France to Nazi Germany in 1940. This tragedy historian and French resistance martyr, Marc Bloch, in his post-humous book “Strange Defeat” (1946) attributed to the death of patriotism and loss of faith in the ideals of France.

Is normalizing hatred of America in politics, media, universities, and on the streets inviting nuclear aggression from Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran, and risking another “Strange Defeat”? The most important lesson of Nagasaki—the United States, the most benign and humanitarian nation in history, was willing to strike Japan with all its nuclear might to achieve victory. What might dictators in Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, or Tehran do against a nuclear weakened and deeply demoralized America?


• **Dr. Peter Vincent Pry**, Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, served as chief of staff on the Congressional EMP Commission, and on the staffs of the House Armed Service Committee and the CIA. He is author most recently of “The Power And The Light” (Amazon.com).

How U.S. And Russian Nuclear Arsenals Evolved

<https://www.statista.com/chart/16305/stockpiled-nuclear-warhead-count/>

by [Niall McCarthy](#), for Statista // Aug 5, 2020

75 years on from the [atomic bombing of Hiroshima](#), more than 13,000 nuclear warheads are still scattered across the world from silos in Montana to isolated corners of [European airbases](#) and even to the ocean depths where ballistic missile submarines lurk as a deterrent nearly impossible to detect.



Hiroshima was the first of two atomic bombings in 1945 and it involved a 15-kiloton device while the weapon used in the attack on Nagasaki three days later had a 22 kiloton yield. Modern nuclear warheads are far more powerful with the U.S. Trident missile yielding a 455 kiloton warhead while Russia's SS ICBM has an 800 kiloton yield. Together, the United States and Russia possess more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons with a stockpile of 8,000 between them, according to the [Federation of American Scientists](#).

Active and inactive warheads in military custody are included in that total but it excludes strategic warheads currently deployed at bases for heavy bombers and on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Even though 8,000 seems like an awfully large number (which it is), it represents a huge reduction on [the number of warheads](#) in existence at the height of the Cold War. This infographic shows how stockpiles evolved, particularly when various arms limitation treaties are taken into account.

The number of warheads fell significantly in the wake of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was signed by the U.S. and USSR in 1987 at a time when both countries possessed more than 60,000 nuclear weapons. The trend towards disarmament continued after the Berlin Wall came down and accelerated when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Despite the decline, it isn't all good news as states are now modernizing their existing stockpiles, adding new types, new delivery systems and committing to possessing the weapons long-term. Developments in Washington D.C. have added to those worries with the Trump administration leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and now threatening to pull out of New START.

That agreement limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 deployed nuclear missiles each. The reason cited by President Trump is that China has to be part of any such agreements in the future and so far, Beijing has categorically ruled out any participation. The treaty will expire in February, weeks after the presidential inauguration. Trump has already abandoned the Iran nuclear accord and he recently took the U.S. out of the Open Skies Treaty, blaming Russia for a lack of compliance.

EMP Ignorance Is Bliss

By: Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, Correcting the record in Rebuttal to a poorly researched recent article..

Kelsey Atherton in “Electromagnetic Pulses Are The Last Thing You Need to Worry About in a Nuclear Explosion” (Foreign Policy July 21, 2020) describes my Task Force on National and Homeland Security (a congressional advisory board) as among the culprits exaggerating the threat from EMP, dismissed by Atherton as “one of America’s weirdest strategic obsessions.”

Unfortunately and irresponsibly, Foreign Policy has not published my rebuttal to Atherton’s erroneous article, allowing their readers to be misinformed.

High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) is generated by a nuclear weapon detonated exo-atmospherically, at an altitude of 30-400 kilometers. No blast or fire or radioactive fallout from a nuclear explosion in the vacuum of outer space reaches the surface of the Earth, only the HEMP. A single nuclear weapon can generate a HEMP field covering much of North America that would blackout electric grids and other life-

sustaining critical infrastructures, paralyze unprotected military forces, and blind radar and satellite National Technical Means needed to identify the attacker.

Atherton does not appear to understand the basic physics of HEMP attack. HEMP does not produce blast, or thermal effects, or radioactive fallout as happens when a nuclear weapon is surface burst or detonated in the atmosphere—which is why nuclear HEMP attack as a matter of science and strategy is in a category all by itself. The obvious strategic advantages and threat from a nuclear HEMP attack have worried the Pentagon for decades, and are a growing concern given the emergence of new technologies like nuclear Super-EMP weapons and increasingly powerful Non-Nuclear EMP weapons in the hands of Russia, China, North Korea, and potentially Iran.

Since 1963, every Democrat and Republican administration and Congress has rightly supported Defense Department programs investing billions of dollars to protect U.S. strategic forces and C3I from the paralyzing effects of EMP attack. Yet, contrary to Atherton, the national electric grid and other life-sustaining critical infrastructures, including those vital to military power projection, have never been protected.

Contrary to Atherton, if a Super-EMP weapon is used, which generates field strengths exceeding U.S. military hardening standards, U.S. retaliatory forces could be paralyzed.

Atherton makes no mention of the bipartisan Congressional EMP Commission, the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, or the USAF Electromagnetic Defense Task Force, comprising the nation's foremost experts on EMP, nuclear weapons and strategy. All independently warn that potential adversaries, including terrorists, could use one or a few nuclear weapons to make an EMP attack that would blackout the national electric grid and other life-sustaining critical infrastructures, bringing America to its knees.

Atherton appears unaware of, or conceals from his readers, the below official assessments of the EMP threat, by expert congressional commissions with access to classified information, and by the White House EMP Executive Order, representing the coordinated view of all relevant U.S. Government departments and agencies:

--“A long-term outage owing to EMP could disable most critical supply chains, leaving the U.S. population living in conditions similar to centuries past, prior to the advent of electric power. In the 1800s, the U.S. population was less than 60 million, and those people had many skills and assets necessary for survival without today's infrastructure. An extended blackout today could result in the death of a large fraction of the American people through the effects of societal collapse, disease, and starvation.” Congressional EMP Commission, Assessing the Threat from EMP Attack (July 2017).

--“Lastly, the United States should take steps to reduce the vulnerability of the nation and the military to attacks with weapons designed to produce electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects...U.S. power projection forces might be subjected to an EMP attack...The homeland might be attacked by terrorists or even state actors with an eye to crippling the U.S. economy and American society. From a technical perspective, it is possible that such attacks could have catastrophic consequences. For example, successful attacks could shut down the electrical system, disable the internet and computers and the economic activity on which they depend, incapacitate transportation systems (and thus the delivery of food and other goods)...” Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, America's Strategic Posture (2009).

--“An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global commerce and stability. The Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.” The White House, Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses (March 26, 2019).

The EMP Commission warns an EMP attack could kill millions of Americans, up to 90% of the population, from starvation, disease, and societal collapse. And the EMP attack could be executed anonymously, by satellite or launched from a freighter or even using a balloon—so the U.S. would not know against whom to retaliate.

Atherton’s dismissal of the EMP threat relies chiefly on a 1983 New York Times article by Richard Garwin, who Atherton misinterprets or misrepresents. In fact, Garwin’s article does not dismiss the EMP threat, but highlights the importance of Defense Department programs protecting U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities from EMP during the Cold War. The EMP Commission warns that the EMP hardening programs, described in Garwin’s article, fell into neglect after the Cold War.

Garwin’s article was written during the Cold War, when the chief scenario was a massive nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR; before the advent of nuclear Super-EMP weapons and modern Non-Nuclear EMP weapons; and before the nuclearization of North Korea, possibly Iran and nuclear terrorists, who might perform an EMP attack to get “the biggest bang for the buck.” Or as the EMP Commission phrased it: “Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.”

Atherton ignores, or is unaware of, Richard Garwin’s testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security on July 22, 2015, advocating protection of the national electric grid from natural (solar storm generated) and nuclear EMP.

Atherton describes as “laughable” that adversaries could or would make a nuclear EMP attack using one or a few weapons, instead of making a large-scale nuclear attack that blasts U.S. cities. But Atherton is obviously unfamiliar with the military doctrines of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran that describe doing exactly what Atherton denies, making nuclear EMP attacks as a dimension of Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare, and Electronic Warfare. (See the EMP Commission report Nuclear EMP Attack Scenarios and Combined-Arms Cyber Warfare July 2017.)

Atherton appears ignorant of Non-Nuclear EMP weapons, like the USAF CHAMP, that are widely available now, even to terrorists, that could be used to inflict a nationwide blackout.

Atherton appears ignorant of the natural EMP threat from the Sun. A solar superstorm, like the 1859 Carrington Event, is inevitable, likelihood estimated by NASA to be 12% per decade, which could blackout electric grids and life-sustaining critical infrastructures worldwide, putting at risk the lives of billions.

It is disappointing that Foreign Policy would publish an article on EMP by someone as ignorant as Atherton, whose views are contradicted by real experts such as Dr. William Graham, Dr. James Schlesinger, and Dr. William Perry.

Graham served as Chairman of the EMP Commission, was on the defense science team that discovered the nuclear EMP phenomenon after the 1962 STARFISH PRIME high-altitude nuclear test, worked on protecting U.S. military systems from EMP since 1963, was President Reagan's White House Science Advisor and ran NASA. Schlesinger and Perry Co-Chaired the Strategic Posture Commission, that warned a nuclear EMP attack by rogue states or terrorists is a real possibility that needs to be addressed urgently. Schlesinger was former Secretary of Defense and Director of CIA. Perry was President Clinton's Secretary of Defense.

Atherton's article is replete with basic errors of fact parading ignorance of EMP:

--In his first paragraph, high-altitude EMP (HEMP), the subject of Atherton's article, was not a factor in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. No HEMP was generated because both bombings were fused for low-altitude atmospheric detonations. Significant HEMP requires detonation at high-altitude, above 30 kilometers. --Atherton references a National Public Radio (NPR) interview with Jeffrey Lewis who found "laughable" a warning by Ambassador R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, that North Korea could make an EMP attack on the United States. Lewis is a political scientist and academic who knows nothing about EMP, but is often cited as an expert on everything nuclear by an equally ignorant press.

--North Korea has the last laugh on Lewis, NPR, and Atherton. Atherton is apparently ignorant that North Korea described its H-bomb, successfully tested in September 2017, as being capable of delivering a Super-EMP attack. Shortly after the H-bomb test, North Korea published a technical article "The EMP Might of Nuclear Weapons" accurately describing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon. The Congressional EMP Commission warns in its 2017 reports that North Korea could make an EMP attack on the U.S.

--Atherton asserts falsely that civilian critical infrastructures vital to U.S. military operations are hardened against EMP. Some telecommunications are protected, but not against Super-EMP effects, and the electric grid and other civilian critical infrastructures are unprotected. --Atherton wrongly implies most military forces are protected against EMP, when very few are protected to 50 kilovolts/meter, and none against Super-EMP effects (above 50 kvs/meter). Even strategic forces may no longer be adequately protected, according to the Congressional EMP Commission.

Atherton wrongly implies that EMP is the "obsession" of individuals and small unofficial groups, ignoring the work of the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, and the USAF Electromagnetic Defense Task Force that all contradict Atherton's absurd assertion that EMPs "are the last thing you need to worry about in a nuclear explosion." These official groups, funded by the Defense Department with access to classified information and the best expertise on nuclear weapons and their effects, all agree that the first, most likely, and perhaps only necessary nuclear attack on the U.S., its overseas forces and allies, might be an EMP.

Atherton is a classic example of an "instant EMP expert" who knows nothing about EMP but unwisely offers uninformed opinions to the public anyway, akin to a medical quack peddling fake cures and false hope to cancer victims. Contrary to non-expert Atherton, EMP is a very real threat that could kill millions of Americans.

For the real story about EMP, see the unclassified EMP Commission reports at www.firstempcommission.org

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We already fought a cold war with Beijing and it went very badly

JULY 31, 2020 Written by [Jonathan Hunt](#)

When General Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed the U.S. Congress in 1951, he warned that to react to a massive communist Chinese counter-offensive across the Yalu River by sending U.S. troops into Manchuria would be “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” By the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and the United States finished hammering out a ceasefire three years later, the border had shifted a few miles to the north, while 36,000 Americans and approximately 3 million Koreans had lost their lives.

[Experts](#), [historians](#), and even a sitting [U.S. senator](#) have heralded a “[new Cold War](#)” with China. The phrase even entered official discourse after [the Global Times](#) — a quasi-official Chinese Communist Party English-language media outlet — fired off the Twitter hashtag #newcoldwar.

Faced with a rising peer competitor for the first time since 1991, the greatest risk is not that Americans would fail to learn the Cold War’s lessons, but that they are learning the wrong ones. In recalling a heroic age when tough-minded American diplomats out-thought their Soviet counterparts, spreading peace and prosperity liberally about the globe, entrapping the Kremlin in snares of its own devising, the new cold warriors have overlooked the true architect of the United States’ greatest setbacks during the Cold War — the very People’s Republic of China they wish to confront today.

Analogies are bewitching things, invoking tantalizing (and often falsified) shared memories as bespoke solutions to big, complex challenges. The crafters of U.S. foreign relations spent decades haunted by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s declaration of “peace in our time” after he appeased Adolf Hitler’s demands for Czechoslovakian *lebensraum* at Munich in 1938.

Before he became John Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy would entrance Harvard students by reenacting the dramatic scene. As David Halberstam put it in his Pulitzer Prize-winning study of how America’s “best and brightest” fell into the Vietnam War during the Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidencies, the “[lesson was of course interventionism, and the wise use of force.](#)”

After Republicans attacked Harry S. Truman in 1949 for “losing China,” the president felt compelled to intervene when North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Il-Sung’s armies crossed the 38th Parallel one year later. Months earlier the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had [judged](#) the Korean peninsula “of little strategic value to the United States” and military action there “ill-advised and impracticable.”

When he reversed course, Truman cited the fascist land grabs of the 1930s in “Manchuria, Ethiopia, [and] Austria” to justify military

intervention under the United Nations and the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, transforming the Cold War from an economic standoff in central Europe to a full-blown contest for supremacy across the Eurasian landmass.

For the Cold War's first quarter century, Asia was a millstone around U.S. leaders' necks. While U.S. Pershing tanks and Thor missiles kept the peace in Europe, to Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Richard Nixon, Eurasia's eastern littoral jutted out like an exposed flank.

The University of Virginia's [Melvyn Leffler](#) and Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow [Ali Wyne](#) have separately remarked, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War falls flat as an analogy in many ways. There are nonetheless some lessons that policymakers should draw from the concurrent, bloodstained feud between the United States and Mao's China.

The Korean War — the Cold War's deadliest — exemplified the dangers of picking the wrong analogy. Although Soviet-American tensions had been on the ascent since 1946, it was in Korea that the Cold War reached terminal velocity, after the twin shocks of the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the Soviet Union's first nuclear test. George Kennan, the Russia hand who first enunciated a strategy of containing the Kremlin "[with unalterable counterforce](#)" wherever it looked to advance, would become a forceful critic of U.S. policy toward nuclear weapons and Vietnam. In 1950, however, he praised Truman's decision to wage war on the Korean Peninsula as "[unquestionably the correct one](#)," missing how Mao might throw the battle-tested People's Liberation Army into the fray, let alone how containment's militarization would lead his country down a series of dead-ends across the Pacific.

While the "domino theory" envisaging a chain reaction of collapsing anticommunist regimes from Vietnam to India is usually associated with Eisenhower, it was Truman who first enunciated such a fear. "If we were to let Asia go," he [warned](#) after Kim's forces moved south in 1950, "the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe." Legends of Moscow's bid for "domination of the Eurasian land mass" yielded immoderate national-security blueprints like NSC 68, whose sole reference to "Asiatics" [imagined](#) faceless, truculent masses spellbound by the Soviet Union's swift evolution "from a backward society to a position of great world power."

While Leninist anti-imperialism resonated with societies that had witnessed imperial rule and trade preferences firsthand, it was wars of national liberation from British, Dutch, French, and Japanese rule, rather than Soviet influence or communist zealotry, that most threatened America's archipelago of military bases and fortified islands on the second island chain.

In Indochina, France's failed counterinsurgency campaign induced Eisenhower and Kennedy to "assume the burden" for Saigon's defense, first by financing the French war effort, then by replacing French legionnaires with American GIs. While Washington paid the bills, Asians paid the price. In 2008, the British Medical Journal [estimated](#) more than 3 million lives were lost during the American phase of the Indochina wars. From 1965 to 1973, the U.S. Air Force dropped more bombs on North Vietnam than all those dropped during the Second World War. Landmines continue [to maim and kill](#), injuring more than 60,000 Vietnamese civilians and ending the lives of another 40,000 since 1973.

Even as U.S Marines landed at Danang, Sino-American competition brought on another wave of bloodletting in Indonesia. From 1965 to 1966, The Indonesian Army and paramilitary bands [directly and indirectly supported](#) by the U.S. government murdered as many as 500,000 suspected Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) supporters and overthrew Sukarno, the founder of the world's fourth most populous country and leader of the Afro-Asian movement.

Disturbed by Sukarno's declaration of a "[Beijing-Pyongyang-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Jakarta Axis](#)" and emboldened by a failed PKI coup in September 1965, U.S. officials helped finance Major General Suharto's counter-coup, which descended into six months of mass killings and 35 years of authoritarian rule. It was not fear of Soviet expansion or even communism *per se* that prompted the CIA to funnel \$15 million to the Indonesia Army; it was fear of the Chinese Communist Party spreading its influence.

As U.S.-PRC relations deteriorate to levels not seen since Tiananmen Square, the superficial bipartisan consensus on challenging Beijing is tempting the same fates as Truman, Kennan, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Cold war is less a model than a cautionary tale, less useful for guiding future action than for illuminating potential errors: not to mistake local grievances for global machinations; not to seek global dominance but instead regional equilibria; not to set out in search of monsters to destroy but rather first to tend to one's own garden.

In their long effort to beat back Soviet influence, an earlier generation of Cold Warriors strew distrust, damage, and death across Asia by ignoring these maxims. Avoiding their mistakes requires more than reciting triumphalist, Euro-centric narratives of the Cold War, in which masterly foreign policy elites dominated a sanitized geopolitical chessboard. It demands a new framework for balancing might and right in a 21st century world through multilateral engagement and principled cooperation.

The U.S. military has options against China

The Hill Online, Aug. 6 | James R. Holmes

Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) is worried — worried about the U.S. Navy's prospects during a war against Communist China in the Western Pacific. Last week, Sen. Gardner, who chairs the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, told the Washington Examiner that Chinese ballistic missiles could compel "all of our planning, all of our equipment, all of our systems" to "basically vacate" the region at outset of fighting. Both large bases and ships riding the waves, he noted, are vulnerable to missile attack.

Sen. Gardner joined a group of Republican lawmakers to coauthor the "STRATEGIC Act," a bill aimed at restoring deterrence and U.S. combat supremacy. To oversimplify, the act's framers envision spreading out U.S. bases across the region, deploying new weaponry to make things tough on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and rejuvenating U.S. alliances and partnerships around the exterior crescent that sweeps from Japan westward around the Asian periphery toward India. Their goal: to convince Chinese Communist Party (CCP) potentates that attacking America's friends and allies would be a hopeless cause or, failing that, that the effort would cost China more than the gains were worth to Xi Jinping & Co.

Either way, Beijing should forego aggression.

How did the U.S. Navy get into such straits? Chiefly by talking itself into believing that victory in the Cold War was forever. In 1992, top Navy and Marine Corps leaders issued a strategy document titled “... From the Sea” that declared, in effect, that there was no one left to fight now that the Soviet Navy sat rusting at its moorings. The sea belonged to the United States and its allies. It was a safe sanctuary from which to project power onto distant shores. Since there was no one left to fight — and never would be, service leaders seemed to think — the sea services no longer should bother developing new weapons and tactics for fighting enemy fleets on the high seas.

“... From the Sea” ordered the services to remake themselves into “a fundamentally different naval force.” And so they did. Trouble is, Beijing evidently didn’t get the message that naval history had ended. The U.S. Navy lay down arms at almost the exact moment CCP leaders resolved to construct a great navy of their own, backed up by an array of land-based aircraft and cruise and ballistic missiles. Their project succeeded — producing the sea force that so vexes Sen. Gardner.

He’s right to fret.

But the U.S. armed forces have options of their own — turning geography to advantage, for one. Look at your map. You will notice that the “first island chain,” which meanders from northern Japan around to the Strait of Malacca, is made up of U.S. allies and friends, and that it forms a natural barrier to air and sea movement between the China seas and the Western Pacific. No Chinese seaport outflanks it. Small bodies of missile-armed troops on the islands, operating in concert with warships and warplanes prowling adjacent waters and skies, could bar the straits Chinese vessels must traverse to escape home waters.

In essence, Washington can threaten to lock up the PLA within the island chain. The military implications alone might give Beijing pause. So might the implications of cutting off the export- and import-driven Chinese economy from foreign harbors. Adm. Liu Huaqing, the founder of the modern PLA Navy, likened the first island chain to a “metal chain” fettering Chinese aspirations. Inventive U.S. strategy and force deployments could make Liu’s nightmare come true.

Sobriety could prevail in Beijing.

Scattering forces on and around the island chain would help ease the senators’ minds with regard to the ballistic-missile threat. Gen. David Berger, the Marine Corps commandant, advocates reengineering U.S. forces in the Western Pacific as “stand-in forces.” Rather than vacate the region to avoid PLA missile barrages, small units that pack a punch would defy them. Instead of big and glamorous, ships, planes and bases would be small, cheap, plentiful and elusive. PLA rocketeers might pick off some of them; the force as a whole would fight on.

And lastly, “naval integration” is all the rage nowadays in U.S. Navy and Marine circles. In the past, Marines were little more than passengers on board Navy transports ferrying them to faraway beaches. No more. Berger wants embarked Marines to take an active hand in fleet operations, especially those near shore. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force and Army are refreshing their own hardware and skills for war at sea. For example, Air Force bombers now drop sea mines ideal for plugging up straits. They also sport long-range anti-ship missiles, ship killers tailor-made for striking along the island chain.

The Pentagon's goal is to forge a composite implement of sea power of which all the services — sea- and ground-based — form integral parts.

Turnabout is fair play in diplomacy and warfare. PLA commanders can try to deny the U.S. armed forces access to Western Pacific seas, skies and shores all they like. But American commanders can reciprocate if they apply intellect and material resources to this strategic problem, and do so with imagination and verve.

Lawmakers should make sure they do.

--James R. Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and co-author of "Red Star over the Pacific." The views voiced here are his alone

'Generation Z' and Foreign Policy: Building a Common Vision of Restraint in a Divided Era

By Jake Mercier

July 30, 2020

Cultivating any coherent national foreign policy won't be possible without a common goal, concrete values, and a clear vision of what America is and should be. But a sharp generational divide provides major obstacles to this path forward, also a real chance for much-needed reform.

In the post-Cold War era, American foreign policy considerations seemed to be increasingly separated from domestic issues. Undergirding the American strategy was the spread of liberal democracy around the world—through international institutions or by force. Domestic support of this project was easy in a world that remembered a forceful America defeating the Nazis and landing on the moon. Today's grandparents and their grandparents remember an America worth fighting for.

The cultural divide between each successive generation is arguably starker today than ever before in history, as the world seems to accelerate at an unrecognizable speed, and as the rules and norms of society change ever more rapidly. From national policy to personal lived experience, the contrast between the younger generation's parents and grandparents seem to offer less and less guidance in a world so strikingly different today than it was 20 or 30 or 50 years ago.

Generation Z, also called 'Gen Z,' 'iGen,' or 'Zoomers,' is generally thought of as the cohort of young people born after 1997 (I myself belong to this generation). Of course, Millennials were born from the early 1980s up until around 1996, with Generation X before them and the Baby Boomers before them.

Older people (especially policymakers) of the Boomer generation still largely occupy a Cold War mindset, hindering any reasonable rapprochement with Russia to counter a real threat out of Beijing, as Nixon did with China in the seventies. The Zoomer generation, ready to begin joining the American workforce and voting population en masse, does not remember a time of long-lasting national solidarity that defined the Reagan Era. We do not remember the Twin Towers falling, or the short-lived period that saw a united country after the attack.

However, what 'Gen Z' does know is a country that has been at war since before many of us were born. They remember the Wall Street crash and rising suicides and deindustrialization and cultural malaise. As the United States faces new international challenges, most notably the rise of China and the decline of American hegemony, a stratified and divided American culture is the biggest obstacle to a national mobilization to counterbalance any foreign threat.

This generational dynamic brings forth both positive and negative potential repercussions for the future. The destruction wrought by decades of failed wars in the Middle East has rightly prompted a whole generation to ask the most basic questions of war and peace; questions it seems most of the 'experts' of the ruling foreign policy blob have pushed aside for too long. It has also brought up new questions: ones of international cooperation,

climate change, and whether or not liberal democracy is truly exportable, or whether liberalism itself is a sustainable structure for developed nations today.

In many ways, this makes sense. A generation of young people have grown up in an America with no central mission beyond ‘growth’ and ‘free trade’ and vague notions of ‘freedom.’ Gen Z is the product of parents who bore the brunt of the Sexual Revolution and its aftermath—broken families, falling marriage rates, and globalization have informed the style of the parents of present-day Zoomers, leaving behind a sense of belonging, tradition, and stability.

Consider this: in China, Gen Z is “more willing to spend, fueled by their increased sense of security and optimism for the future,” a stark contrast to distinct levels of financial and personal insecurity for Gen Z in America. The same Bloomberg article cited a 2017 study by the University of Michigan, where nearly 53% of Gen Z High school seniors in the United States said that “the country will get worse in 5 years.”

American cities falter, the country’s government is inert, and the United States is fast losing its international ability to inspire. Looking to a country like China, whose middle class has expanded beyond belief and whose technologically advanced cities have sprung up from the ashes in a matter of two or three short decades, how can a generation growing up in a culture so fractured and devoid of heart support the export of liberalism to an unwilling world?

According to a study by the CATO institute, “Millennials and Generation Z are also less worried about foreign threats than their elders, including terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the rise of China. And as a recent study by the Center for American Progress found, just 45 percent of Millennials and Generation Z agreed that the United States is stronger when it “takes a leading role in the world” compared to 59 percent of Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation.”

A common vision in which all generations can get behind, especially in the fragmented internet age, has yet to be presented. Simply preserving America’s standing in the world will become more difficult as domestic strife increases. Many young people don’t recognize an America that they want to keep, and would rather turn it upside down.

While this new generation will certainly bring some positives into the foreign policy conversation, with Gen Z's grievances toward wasteful wars, climate change, and a lack of international cooperation, it will also pose new challenges in the form of domestic issues—like student debt, barriers to family formation, and inability to own capital—that contribute to a lack of spirit that must accompany any serious international project.

Great power competition with China will be a signature feature of American politics for decades to come, as it should be. But uniting a coalition of restraint-minded Americans won’t be effective if its core constituency is based around the single-issue of uniting older war-weary Americans with detached Zoomers. It must also consider healing domestic fragmentation by investing in American industry, cities, infrastructure, education, and more—resulting in a healthier, more robust, and optimistic country could possibly one day, again, be ready to unify under a common vision of what the American project should be.

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Negotiating with Great Powers on Nuclear Arms

RealClearDefense.com, Aug. 3 | Frank Klotz, John Lauder and William Courtney

The Trump Administration has yet to decide the fate of the sole remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty, New START, which expires in February. Among other conditions, it insists that any follow-on nuclear accord with Russia must also include China.

Striking a deal with Beijing in the next six months is highly unlikely. Accordingly, if the U.S. should agree to extend New START it could help ensure current limits on Russian nuclear forces remain in place. It might also adopt a different, multilateral approach to engaging China in arms control talks.

The administration has a valid point about China. Under New START, the U.S. and Russia further reduced their nuclear-equipped heavy bombers, long-range missiles, and deployed warheads. China, which is not a party to the treaty, has meanwhile steadily expanded its smaller but still potent nuclear force. This build-up calls into question Beijing's intentions regarding its long-held policies of "no-first-use" and maintaining only a minimum deterrent force.

China has repeatedly rejected calls to join nuclear arms control negotiations with the U.S. and Russia and did so again earlier this month. Beijing asserts that the two nuclear superpowers must first slash their arsenals to even lower levels. Likewise, it has been reluctant to be more transparent about its nuclear intentions, claiming that secrecy is essential to the survivability of its smaller force.

But there are reasons to believe that China could be persuaded to be more open to discussions on controlling nuclear arms, particularly if they involved a broader set of negotiating partners and if a formal arms limitation treaty were not the immediate objective.

First, the timing may be propitious. China has become more isolated internationally as a result of its repression in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, large-scale theft of intellectual property, and early mishandling and cover-up of the COVID pandemic. Beijing might be looking for ways to appear more cooperative on the world stage.

Second, China has played constructive roles in other nuclear-related negotiations. For example, it signed the multilateral 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and participated in the international monitoring system to detect nuclear explosions around the world. Five of the system's seismic stations are on Chinese territory.

China also played a constructive role in negotiations leading to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal aimed at limiting that country's pathways to developing nuclear weapons. With U.S. encouragement, China took a lead role in redesigning an Iranian heavy water reactor that could have been used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Third, China may be more willing to participate in negotiations if the U.S. can persuade France and the U.K. to do likewise. All five officially recognized nuclear weapon states (the so-called "P5") collaborated successfully in the Iran negotiations. As Beijing has publicly signaled, a P5 format might be more conducive to Chinese participation than the prospect of negotiating alone with the two nuclear superpowers.

Fourth, some Chinese analysts have suggested that their country's views on nuclear transparency may be evolving due to growing confidence in the survivability of its nuclear forces and because secrets are increasingly hard to keep in a world of high-resolution commercial satellites and widespread sharing of information on the internet.

These considerations offer some hope that Beijing might be open to dialogue on nuclear transparency, monitoring, and verification measures akin to those the U.S. and Russia have long accepted.

For example, merging the separate U.S.-Russian and Russian-Chinese agreements to notify each other of long-range ballistic missile launches and expanding the concept to include all members of the P5 might be a good place to start building confidence and setting a useful precedent.

Likewise, P5 joint verification experiments or mock inspections might increase understanding of the modalities and value of measures to increase nuclear openness and predictability. Similar activities in other contexts, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaties, have helped international participants gain experience and work together. The inclusion of all five countries might bolster a sense of inclusion and fairness as well as help lay groundwork for cooperation on more challenging issues, eventually including verifiable agreements to limit nuclear arms.

Overcoming China's reticence to engage in nuclear-related talks will likely take deft diplomacy, time, and patience. Washington may need to weigh the importance of China's cooperation in nuclear arms control with other U.S. goals. The issue of participating in five-way nuclear negotiations could also require debate and consensus-building within France and the U.K.

In the meantime, the threat posed by Russian nuclear forces remains. Extension of the 2010 New START Treaty does not require Senate ratification, only presidential approval. Failure to take such a simple and prudent step could be a mistake of epic proportions.

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Sarmat: Russia's New ICBMs Have Been Decades in the Making (But Worth the Wait?)

Though their development has been rocky, once they're in service, they could change the balance of ballistic missile power in Russia's favor
National Interest Online, July 31 | Caleb Larson

One of Russia's farthest-reaching missiles is the SS-18 Satan. This intercontinental silo-based missile has a purported range of around ten thousand kilometers, or about sixty-two hundred miles and is equipped with a nuclear warhead. Although the Satan's range is undeniably impressive, the missile is old. The original variant of the missile was developed nearly fifty years ago, in the early 1970, and the latest in the late 1980s—already over thirty years ago. It's in need of a replacement—the Sarmat.

The Sarmat likely has an even greater range than the Satan. Though concrete details are difficult to come by, the range could be as great as eighteen hundred kilometers, or nearly 11,200 miles. Development started sometime in the 2000s, with an initial prototype produced in 2015. In addition to the obvious utility of a single nuclear warhead, the Sarmat is rumored to also be able to carry ten large warheads, or sixteen smaller warheads. One of its more novel uses is as the delivery vehicle for a hypersonic boost-glide weapon also currently in development.

Development was not always smooth though—the first test launch from a ground-based silo uncovered technical problems with the launch system equipment. The Sarmat’s introduction has been delayed several times, with initial introduction originally scheduled for 2018, then pushed back to 2021 but it currently seems unlikely that this second target date will be met.

RS-26 Rubezh

The Rubezh is a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile that rides towards its launch site on a large off-road capable carrier. Like the Sarmat, initial testing experienced a few hiccups on the way to operational deployment. The Rubezh’s first launch in 2011 ended in failure when the missile experienced problems, possibly navigational in nature, and crashed not far from the launch site.

Interestingly, the Rubezh may be in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Rubezh’s initial flight tests utilized a specialized light-weight warhead, which gave the missile enough range (approximately fifty-eight hundred kilometers) to comply with the INF Treaty, which explicitly prohibits signatories from fielding missiles with a five hundred to fifty-five hundred kilometer range. However, a later test used a heavier warhead, reducing the missile’s range by about thirty-eight hundred kilometers. This two-thousand-kilometer test has raised questions about Russia’s adherence to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Avanguard

Perhaps the most remarkable of these missiles is the hypersonic Avanguard nuclear boost-glide vehicle. Testing in one form or another has dragged on and on. Initial designs for the Avanguard were drawn up as far back as the 1980s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Avanguard’s development was paused.

As a boost-glide vehicle, the Avanguard is initially transported by a ballistic missile. Remember the Sarmat’s unique payload capabilities? It is to be the primary—perhaps only—delivery method for the Avanguard.

Although the Russian Ministry of Defense initially claimed that the Avanguard would enter service with the Russian armed forces sometime in 2019, this is likely an optimistic schedule. Members of the Russian Ministry of Defense have previously admitted to development issues related to sufficiently robust heat shielding for the hypersonic missile, which is supposed to fly at mind-numbingly fast Mach 20 speeds.

Untested

The development and testing of these missiles is not yet finished. Keep an eye on this topic for developments in the near future.

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Why we must end our reliance on nuclear weapons

On the 75th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, the author Eric Schlosser explains the new nuclear threats facing the world
The Sunday Times (UK), Aug. 2, Pg. 16 | Eric Schlosser

The atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima 75 years ago this Thursday, nicknamed "Little Boy", was a remarkably crude and inefficient weapon. It was designed with slide rules, not computers, and built by hand. One of its crucial components had been forged by wrapping a sheet of aluminium around a Coke bottle. And the simplicity of its design — two pieces of uranium-235 that would slam together to create nuclear fission — made the bomb extremely vulnerable to accidental detonation during a plane crash. Captain William S Parsons, the commander in charge of the mission, secretly decided to complete the final assembly of Little Boy in mid-air, once the B-29 bomber carrying it had flown a safe distance from the US airbase at Tinian, in the west Pacific. He feared the base might be destroyed and thousands of servicemen killed if something went wrong.

Little Boy was dropped over Hiroshima at 8.16am on August 6, 1945. It detonated at an altitude of roughly 1,900ft, above the Aioi Bridge in the heart of the city. The temperature on the bridge reached perhaps 5,500C, and everyone nearby was vaporised. A firestorm engulfed the city, as a mushroom cloud rose about ten miles into the sky. But the force of the detonation could have been much larger: 98.62 per cent of the uranium in Little Boy had failed to undergo nuclear fission. It had simply blown apart. About 80,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed immediately or shortly after the explosion, and more than two-thirds of the buildings were destroyed because 0.7g of uranium-235 was turned into pure energy. A dollar bill weighs more than that.

Three days later Nagasaki was struck by a more sophisticated atomic bomb with a plutonium core. Less than a week later, on August 15, Japan unconditionally surrendered. At first Americans viewed the atomic bomb as a wonderful thing, a super-weapon that had ended the war against Japan. But soon the implications began to sink in. The level of devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki wasn't unusual at the time: the US had destroyed scores of other Japanese cities through aerial bombardment. More people had been killed during the firebombing of Tokyo a few months earlier, and only 0.5 per cent of the city of Toyama was left standing after it was attacked by American bombers. What had changed, for ever, was the swiftness and economics of mass murder.

Beginning with the Nanjing Massacre in 1937, it took the Japanese about seven and a half years to kill approximately 10-15 million civilians, mainly in China, using conventional, chemical and biological weapons. Thousands of American planes and tens of thousands of bombs had been required to destroy Tokyo. Nuclear weapons now made it possible for one plane, carrying one bomb, to destroy a city in the blink of an eye. Quickly and at relatively little cost, an entire civilisation could be annihilated.

After the destruction of Hiroshima, an influential US senator, Brien McMahon, declared that the atomic bomb was "the most important thing in history since the birth of Jesus Christ". Seventy-five years later, McMahon's comment doesn't seem like hyperbole. Today's nuclear weapon systems, compared with Little Boy, embody the sort of technological advance that differentiates the Tesla from a Ford Model T. Nine countries now possess a nuclear arsenal — the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — and more than a dozen have the means to acquire one. The spread of these weapons has greatly increased the danger of accidents, malfunctions, miscalculations, nuclear terrorism and sabotage, as well as the possibility that a head of state might decide to use one against an adversary.

Along with pandemics and climate change, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. But the nuclear threat receives nowhere near the attention of those other two. The world's roughly 13,000 nuclear weapons remain out of sight and largely out of mind, hidden away in missile silos, underground bunkers and ballistic missile submarines. As Russia, China and America stand on the brink of a new nuclear arms race, the risk of catastrophe becomes greater in all sorts of novel ways.

When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949, the US lost its status as the sole nuclear power. The two nations competed for the next four decades to gain military supremacy, building more than 100,000 nuclear weapons, some of them thousands of times more powerful than Little Boy, some small enough to be carried in a backpack. The superpower rivalry also created ample job opportunities for nuclear strategists. Although a few thought that a nuclear war could be fought and won, most believed in various theories of nuclear deterrence. No rational leader would launch a nuclear attack on an adversary, it was assumed, if that adversary could retaliate with a nuclear strike too, assuring the destruction of both sides.

Nuclear deterrence never felt stable to the professional nuclear strategists, it seemed continually endangered by the introduction of new weapon systems. In the 1950s the Rand Corporation, a think tank in Santa Monica, California, became the intellectual citadel for American nuclear strategy. Albert Wohlstetter, a Rand analyst, famously argued that the success of nuclear deterrence relied upon a "delicate balance of terror". Both sides needed to understand and deeply fear the consequences of using nuclear weapons. Another Rand analyst, Fred Ikle, expressed doubts about a policy that relied upon a threat to slaughter civilians in order to keep the peace. Aiming nuclear weapons at cities, Ikle argued, could lead to a "form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages — the mass killing of hostages". But nobody could come up with a strategy for using these weapons that wouldn't kill millions of civilians once a nuclear war began.

The stress, anxiety and uncertainty that Captain Parsons felt on that first atomic bombing run to Hiroshima pervaded the command and control of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War. The weapons often seemed on the verge of slipping out of control, getting lost, getting stolen or detonating by accident. The US Department of Defence claims there have been 32 serious accidents, known as "broken arrows", involving American nuclear weapons. While researching my book *Command and Control*, I obtained a document through the Freedom of Information Act that said at least 1,200 US nuclear weapons were involved in accidents between 1950 and 1968. Some were trivial; others were potentially catastrophic and yet never appeared on the Pentagon's "official" list. Nuclear warheads atop missiles were struck by lightning, atomic bombs were mistakenly armed by ground crews, hydrogen bombs were inadvertently dropped by American planes onto American soil the list goes on and on.

Similar accidents occurred in Britain. On January 16, 1961, for example, the fuel tanks of an American F-100D fighter plane ruptured at RAF Lakenheath. The fuel caught fire and the flames engulfed a Mark 28 hydrogen bomb mounted beneath the plane. That version of the Mark 28 had safety flaws that made it vulnerable to detonation when exposed to prolonged heat. The fire was extinguished before the bomb could be badly damaged, sparing the Suffolk countryside. Other mishaps were more effectively covered up. In 2003 the Ministry of Defence finally published a list of 27 incidents; nuclear watchdogs have counted scores more.

On November 6, 2018, a Royal Navy nuclear submarine nearly collided with a ferry carrying more than 200 passengers between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Based on the design of the periscope, observers identified it as a Trident submarine, which can carry up to 16 ballistic missiles. The

Marine Accident Investigation Board noted: "This was the third accident or incident between a dived Royal Navy submarine and a surface vessel in four years, which is a matter of significant concern."

In Stanley Kubrick's film *Dr Strangelove*, a deranged American general decides to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. When the film was released in 1964, it was attacked for being implausible and unpatriotic. Only the president had the authority to order a nuclear attack, its critics argued, and mechanisms were in place to prevent any unauthorised use. In fact, the film provided a more accurate depiction of American command vulnerabilities than anything that appeared in the mainstream media or academic literature in that era.

Until the early 1970s there were no codes or locks installed to prevent an American bomber crew or missile crew from using its nuclear weapons. If a rogue crew had wanted to destroy Leningrad — or Pittsburgh, or Chicago — there were no technical means to stop them. The US air force and navy feared that putting locks on nuclear weapons might somehow enable the Soviets to tamper with the locks, render the weapons inoperable, and thereby disarm the US. For the first quarter of a century of the Cold War, the discipline and professionalism of the American military was all that stood in the way of a madman or a fanatic in uniform setting off a nuclear detonation.

In the autumn of 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US and the Soviet Union came perilously close to a nuclear war that would have killed hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, of people. Even more unsettling, President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier, desperately wanted to avoid such a war but almost got one anyway. Over the course of two weeks a series of intelligence failures, misunderstandings, misguided recommendations by high-level advisers and poor communications tested the limits of nuclear deterrence. In the absence of any hotline between the two leaders, urgent messages were sent by letter, telegram and radio announcement. Asked about the risk that a nuclear war could have occurred during the crisis, Kennedy later said that the odds were about one in three.

When giving that estimate, Kennedy was unaware that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons available for immediate use throughout the crisis, not only on Cuba but also on submarines off the coast. Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov, an officer on one of those subs, had persuaded its captain not to fire a torpedo with a nuclear warhead at a group of American warships on October 27, 1962. The captain mistakenly believed the sub was under attack — and very nearly precipitated a nuclear holocaust.

At the age of 18, while serving in the US army, William J Perry walked the streets of Tokyo right after the end of the Second World War. Almost every wooden building had been burnt to the ground, and most of the concrete, stone and brick buildings were heavily damaged. Many of the people he saw were dressed in rags, wandering in a daze. It was a scene of utter devastation and defeat. It brought to mind Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and how other great cities might vanish instantly in some future nuclear war.

Perry subsequently founded one of the early electronics companies in Silicon Valley, became the undersecretary of defence in charge of research during the administration of President Carter, helped to develop stealth technology and served as secretary of defence for three years under President Clinton. He spent the Cuban Missile Crisis in Washington, examining satellite photographs and helping to prepare intelligence reports for the White House. "Every day when I walked into my analysis centre," Perry, 92, recently told me, "I believed it would be my last day on Earth." In retrospect, I asked him, what do you think were the odds that the Cuban stand-off between Kennedy and Khrushchev could have ended in a nuclear war? "Slightly higher than 50-50 that we could have destroyed the world," he replied.

Perry worries that the next nuclear arms race may be bigger and more dangerous than the one during the Cold War. The bipolar nuclear rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union has been replaced by shifting, multipolar rivalries. The balance of terror is much harder to maintain among nine nations than among two. All of the countries that possess nuclear weapons are now modernising their arsenals. The UK plans to spend anywhere from £40 billion to £200 billion replacing its Trident ballistic missile submarines — even though, a decade from now, undersea drones may be capable of tracking and destroying such large subs. The US plans to spend almost \$2 trillion (£1.6 trillion) updating its nuclear bombers, missiles and submarines. Russia plans to deploy ballistic missiles with high-speed, manoeuvrable warheads and unmanned, long-range submarines that carry nuclear weapons. China's nuclear arsenal is shrouded in secrecy, but it is clearly being modernised and expanded.

All of this is occurring while America abandons arms-control agreements — pulling out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, the Treaty on Open Skies this November and perhaps the New Start treaty next February. Members of the Trump administration have discussed staging America's first nuclear test since 1992, defying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In his recent book *The Button*, Perry laments the fact that the US president has the sole unchecked authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. Questions about the mental health of President Trump, or his impulsiveness, are not the issue; no single person should have the power to kill billions of people. Vladimir Putin most likely possesses the same sort of unchecked authority in Russia. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without a nuclear exchange, Perry says, "but I hate to count on good luck to save our civilisation".

Theories of nuclear deterrence are predicated on rational actors who cherish a desire to live. The world now has many radical extremist groups that celebrate the killing of civilians, the destruction of cultural monuments and martyrdom on behalf of a cause. The revival of ancient hatreds and fierce nationalisms has made the threat of nuclear terrorism more plausible. At present there are about 1,500 tonnes of weapons-grade uranium in the world, as well as about 500 tonnes of plutonium, stored at hundreds of different locations. The amount needed to make a powerful nuclear device could fit in a small gym bag. The security of weapon storage sites in India, Pakistan, Russia and North Korea has long been questioned, but in 2012 an 82-year-old nun and two fellow peace activists over 50 years of age managed to break into the Y-12 National Security Complex — a state-of-the-art storage facility in Tennessee that holds about 400 tonnes of weapons-grade uranium. Well-trained commandos might have been able to steal some or even detonate it within the building.

During the Cold War a number of false alarms revealed the flaws in earlywarning systems and the danger of keeping land-based missiles on hair-trigger alert. Once launched, the missiles could not be destroyed mid-flight or called back. Those dangers still exist, and the problem has been compounded by a threat that hardly existed during the Cold War: a cyberattack. The insertion of viruses and malware into a nuclear command-and-control system could potentially disable it, spoof it into falsely reporting an enemy attack, or even give launch orders to missile crews. At a minimum, a successful cyberattack could create uncertainty and doubt about the reliability of systems that are supposed to secure and control the most lethal weapons ever invented.

"Hacking nuclear systems was once believed to be an impossible task," a report by the think tank Chatham House said in 2018. "Yet history has shown that human error, system failures and design vulnerabilities are common occurrences in nuclear weapon systems." Proprietary software for

weapons systems can be written, chips and hardware can be specially manufactured, computers can be physically isolated from unsecured networks and thereby blocked from cyberattacks via the internet — but the insider threat remains one of the most difficult to thwart. A relatively low-level private contractor at the National Security Agency, Edward Snowden, managed to obtain some of the top secrets at one of America's most secretive institutions. A disgruntled insider within the nuclear command system could cause tremendous harm.

During the Cold War the nuclear forces were considered an elite, highly desirable job posting. Today they are often viewed as a career dead end, marred by poor morale. Missile launch officers in the US air force have in recent years been caught cheating on their exams and using cocaine, ecstasy and amphetamines. One launch officer was given a 25-year prison sentence for selling illegal drugs, heading a violent street gang and committing sexual assault. These officers were responsible for overseeing Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles with warheads about 20 times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

The Royal Navy has experienced similar personnel issues, which jeopardise the safe management of nuclear weapons and create the potential for blackmail. Last year three sailors on HMS Vengeance, a Trident submarine, were kicked out of the navy for using cocaine. In 2017, nine sailors on the Trident sub HMS Vigilant were dismissed for drug use, and the captain was removed from duty for having an "inappropriate relationship" with a crew member.

The United Nations came into existence a few months after the destruction of Hiroshima. The first resolution it passed called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. That goal has been pursued ever since, with some success.

Five nuclear weapon-free zones have been established by treaty, covering all of Africa, Latin America, central Asia, southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Only nine of the 193 countries in the UN possess nuclear weapons, and just two — the US and Russia — have about 90 per cent of them. By signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, America and the Soviet Union promised to support nuclear disarmament. Their arsenals have indeed decreased in size by more than three quarters since the end of the Cold War. But the thousands of nuclear weapons that are still deployed present abolitionists with a real challenge.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Ican) was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2017. Beatrice Fihn, the Swedish jurist who serves as executive director of Ican, told me that she thinks the coronavirus pandemic may help reframe notions of national security. Expenditures on multibillion-dollar nuclear weapon systems will be harder to justify. The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, initiated by Ican, has gained the signature of 40 nations. When 10 more sign the treaty, it will become international law, banning the development, production, storage and use of nuclear weapons. Such a ban, of course, won't eliminate the nuclear threat. It will, however, apply pressure for meaningful arms reductions among the nuclear states, and discourage those states that don't have these weapons from obtaining them. Incremental progress is better than none.

Almost 20 years ago a prominent epidemiologist warned me that a deadly, viral, respiratory pandemic would someday spread and that no nation was prepared for it. Such warnings became more frequent during the past decade — yet little was done. It took images of overflowing hospitals, physicians dressed in biohazard suits and empty streets to prompt action. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in a large city would similarly and belatedly gain attention for the cause of disarmament.

In 2006 the Rand Corporation released a study on the potential impact of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon on Long Beach, California, a port town south of Los Angeles. The findings were memorable: about 60,000 people would die instantly from the blast or soon thereafter from radiation poisoning. An additional 150,000 would be sickened by radiation and require immediate medical attention. Many thousands of people would suffer serious burns. It would be an understatement to say that local hospitals could not handle that volume of patients. The entire state of California has roughly 125 beds in its hospital burn units. New York has about 80. The fact is, there is no city nor any country on Earth that could cope with the mass casualties from a nuclear blast.

The thought of your neighbourhood and your city being destroyed isn't hypothetical for Setsuko Thurlow, 88. She is one of a dwindling number of hibakushas — the survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She was a 13-year-old schoolgirl when Little Boy ignited Hiroshima. Her parents survived but eight of her relatives and hundreds of her classmates were killed. Thurlow studied English literature at college in Japan, gained a graduate degree in America, settled in Canada and became an anti-nuclear campaigner. She has devoted her life to preventing another Hiroshima and accepted the Nobel peace prize for Ican, alongside Beatrice Fihn. "Every second of every day, nuclear weapons endanger everyone we love and everything we hold dear," Thurlow said in her Nobel speech. "We must not tolerate this insanity any longer."

--Eric Schlosser is the author of *Fast Food Nation* (2001), *Command and Control* (2013) and *Gods of Metal* (2015), and cocreator of *The Bomb*, a multimedia piece at pioneerworks.org Beijing will be on par with nuclear superpowers by 2030

The Times (UK), Aug. 1, Pg. 42 | Michael Evans

China will rival the US and Russia in nuclear capability by the end of the decade, leading to a three-way face-off for the first time, an American commander said yesterday.

Throughout the Cold War the US and Soviet Union were the only peer competitors, each with long-range nuclear weapons delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles and strategic bombers. However, China has made such a rapid advance in nuclear weaponry that it will also have all three components the nuclear triad when its dedicated strategic bomber becomes operational. The H-20 is the first stealth bomber to be designed in China.

"China is on a trajectory to be a strategic peer to us by the end of the decade, so for the first time ever the US is going to face two peer-capable nuclear competitors," Admiral Charles Richard, commander of US Strategic Command, told a video-linked nuclear deterrence forum.

The new nuclear reality meant that the Pentagon had to rethink its deterrence strategy, Admiral Richard said. It was possible the US could face "two very different nuclear competitors", which would require two methods of deterrence.

The US is modernising its own nuclear triad, replacing the Minuteman III ICBMs with a land-based system, swapping Ohio class ballistic-missile submarines for Columbia class boats, and building a next-generation strategic stealth bomber. The B-21 Raider is expected to make its maiden flight in late 2021 or early 2022.

However, China, he said, had achieved a "breathtaking expansion". "It has been near-stunning. They always go faster than we do, and while they espouse a minimum deterrence strategy, they have a number of capabilities that seem inconsistent with that," he added, referring to China's investment in new road-mobile ICBMs.

UK lobbies US to support controversial new nuclear warheads

Letter from defence secretary seen by Guardian draws Britain into debate pitting Trump administration against many Democrats

The Guardian Online (UK), Aug. 1 | Julian Borger

The UK has been lobbying the US Congress in support of a controversial new warhead for Trident missiles, claiming it is critical for “the future of Nato as a nuclear alliance”.

A letter from Britain’s defence secretary, Ben Wallace, seen by the Guardian, urged Congress to support initial spending on the warhead, the W93.

The letter, sent in April but not previously reported, draws the UK into a US political debate, pitting the Trump administration against many Democrats and arms control groups over whether the \$14bn W93 programme is necessary. The US navy already has two warheads to choose from for its submarine-launched Trident missiles.

The close cooperation on the W93 casts further doubt on the genuine independence of the UK deterrent – parliament first heard about it when US officials accidentally disclosed Britain’s involvement in February – and the commitment of both countries to disarmament.

The UK is also supporting the administration’s efforts to speed up work on the warhead and its surprise \$53m request for initial weapon design work in the 2021 budget, two years ahead of the previous schedule.

Sceptics believe the rush is intended to lock in funding before the election. A Biden administration would be likely to review or even cancel the W93 programme.

“These are challenging times, but it is crucial that we demonstrate transatlantic unity and solidarity in this difficult period,” Wallace told members of the House and Senate armed services committees. “Congressional funding in [2021] for the W93 program will ensure that we continue to deepen the unique nuclear relationship between our two countries, enabling the United Kingdom to provide safe and assured continuous-at-sea deterrence for decades to come.”

The British intervention comes as the initial funding for the warhead hangs in the balance. It was approved by the House and Senate armed services committees but blocked at least temporarily, by a House energy and water subcommittee last month.

Congressional staffers said they could not recall such a direct UK intervention in a US debate on nuclear weapons.

“We’ve never had a letter of this sort before, so it was a little bit surprising that this is the issue that they chose to weigh in on,” a committee aide said.

The UK insists its Trident nuclear deterrent is autonomous, but the two countries share the same missiles and coordinate work on warheads. The current UK Trident warhead, the Holbrook, is very similar to the W76 warhead, one of two the US navy uses in its own Trident II missiles.

The US and UK versions of the W93 are also expected to resemble each other closely. Both countries will use the same new MK7 aeroshell, the cone around the warhead that allows it to re-enter the earth's atmosphere, which will cost another several hundred million dollars.

Little has been disclosed about the W93, but it is thought to be based on a design that was tested during the cold war but not made part of the US stockpile at the time. It will potentially be the first new warhead design in the US stockpile since the cold war and is expected to be of considerably higher yield than the current W76, which is already six times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima 75 years ago next week.

The demand for funding for the W93 is particularly controversial in the US as the W76 and a higher-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead, the W88, have already been subject to multibillion-dollar upgrades.

“This is excess on top of excess,” Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, said. “We already have two SBLM warheads. The W76 just went through a major life extension programme and is slated to be good into the early 2040s, and the W88 is going through a major alteration.

“The US can continue to assist the UK's arsenal without rushing the development of an unnecessary, at least \$14bn new-design, third SLBM warhead,” Reif added.

The total cost of the US nuclear weapons modernisation programme is expected to be far in excess of \$1tn.

The US and Russia, which is also upgrading its arsenal and developing new weapons, together account for more than 90% of all the nuclear warheads on the planet, and both countries are putting increasing emphasis on them in their rhetoric and defence postures.

Under Donald Trump, the US has now left three nuclear agreements and his administration is reluctant to extend the last major arms control deal with Russia, the 2010 New Start treaty, which is due to expire in February.

The bonfire of nuclear accords, combined with the huge amounts spent on weapons like the W93, are a threat to the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the fundamental bargain by which countries without nuclear arms pledged not to acquire them on condition the recognised nuclear powers (the US, UK, France, Russia and China) took steps to disarm, under article six of the treaty.

“When I look at something like the W93, it's not, in and of itself, a violation of article six,” said Daniel Joyner, a University of Alabama law professor specializing in nuclear treaties. “It's just a further data point to evidence, the current non-compliance of the US and UK with article six.”

In his letter to the congressional committees, Wallace wrote: “Your support to the W93 program in this budget cycle is critical to the success of our replacement warhead programme and to the long-term viability of the UK's nuclear deterrent and therefore, the future of Nato as a nuclear alliance.”

Alexandra Bell, a former state department official and now senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said the US-UK special relationship had shown greater solidarity in promoting new weapons than in arms control.

“The UK is noticeably missing when it comes to emphatic support for New Start extension, but yet at the same time it feels comfortable directly telling members of Congress what they should do about our own modernization plans,” Bell said. “I think that’s weird.”

Asked about the purpose of Wallace’s letter, a UK defense ministry spokesman said: “The UK’s existing warhead is being replaced in order to respond to future threats and guarantee our security. We have a strong defence relationship with the US and will work closely with our ally to ensure our warhead remains compatible with the US’s Trident missile.”

According to official figures, the US W76 warhead is viable until 2045 at least - and the UK version is expected to last until the late 2030’s, so there is no urgent technical need for replacement.

Greg Mello, executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, said nuclear weapons hawks at the Pentagon, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Los Alamos National Laboratory were pushing to lock in spending in case there is a change of administration.

“They would like to get this program endorsed by Congress this year, and they’re very close to it,” Mello said. “Once it is a programme of record, it will take more for a future administration to knock it out.”

U.S. presidential candidate Biden vows to work toward nuke-free world

Kyodo News (Japan), Aug. 6 | Not Attributed

WASHINGTON -- Presumptive U.S. Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden said Thursday he will strive for a world without nuclear weapons, criticizing Republican President Donald Trump for undermining past efforts to curb the dangers of such arsenals.

"I will work to bring us closer to a world without nuclear weapons, so that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are never repeated," Biden said in a statement, touching on a long-term goal set by former President Barack Obama when Biden served as vice president.

The statement was released on the 75th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. A second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki three days later and Japan surrendered six days after that, marking the end of World War II.

"The United States became the first, and so far only, country to use a nuclear weapon in war," Biden said, adding that "the scenes of death and destruction, first from Hiroshima and then Nagasaki, still horrify us, three-quarters of a century later."

The former vice president said there is a "collective responsibility" to ensure such weapons will never again be used, but suggested that steps toward that "ultimate" goal would be incremental.

Efforts should begin with the United States and Russia agreeing to extend their nuclear arms reduction pact, which is set to expire in February 2021, he said.

"For decades, American leaders of both parties have understood that the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce nuclear threats, including by negotiating treaties and agreements to control and eventually eliminate these weapons," Biden said.

"But, as with so much else, Donald Trump has squandered this inheritance," he added.

In the Nov. 3 presidential election, nuclear policy may become an issue, as Trump has pursued a policy of expanding the role of U.S. nuclear weapons.

On arms control issues, the president withdrew the country from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a 1987 pact with Russia.

The only remaining arms control treaty between the two nuclear superpowers is the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Trump has been eager to pursue arms control measures that would involve both Russia and China, but Beijing has so far dismissed the idea and some critics in the United States have said it may be an excuse for not getting a renewed agreement of the so-called New START.

Biden also asserted that Trump's "showmanship with North Korea has not constrained its growing nuclear arsenal," apparently referring to the little progress the summit diplomacy between Trump and Kim Jong Un yielded in ridding Pyongyang of its nuclear weapons.

"As president, I will restore American leadership on arms control and nonproliferation as a central pillar of U.S. global leadership. I will strengthen our alliances to keep the American people safe from nuclear and other global threats," Biden said.

Our annual August debate over America's use of atomic bombs

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/aug/5/our-annual-august-debate-over-americas-use-of-atom/>

The dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan during war draws arguments over U.S. shortcomings

By [Victor Davis Hanson](#) - - Wednesday, August 5, 2020

This month marks the 75th anniversary of the dropping of two atomic bombs on [Japan](#), at Hiroshima on Aug. 6, and Nagasaki on Aug. 9.

Each year, Americans argue about our supposed moral shortcomings for being the only nation to have used an atomic weapon in war. Given the current cultural revolution that topples statues, renames institutions, cancels out the supposedly politically incorrect and wages war on America's past, we will hear numerous attacks on the decision of Democratic President [Harry Truman](#) to use the two terrible weapons.

But what were the alternatives that [Truman](#) faced had he not dropped the bombs that precipitated [Japan](#)'s agreement to surrender less than a week after the bombing of Nagasaki and formally on Sept. 2? One, [Truman](#) could have allowed [Japan](#)'s wounded military government to stop the killing

and stay in power. But the Japanese had already killed more than 10 million Chinese civilians since 1931, and perhaps another 4 million to 5 million Pacific Islanders, Southeast Asians and members of the Allied Forces since 1940.

A mere armistice rather than unconditional surrender would have meant the Pacific War had been fought in vain. [Japan](#)'s fascist government likely would have regrouped in a few years to try it again on more favorable terms. Two, [Truman](#) could have postponed the use of the new bombs and invaded [Japan](#) over the ensuing year. The planned assault was scheduled to begin on the island of Kyushu in November 1945, and in early 1946 would have expanded to the main island of Honshu.

Yet, [Japan](#) had millions of soldiers at home with fortifications, planes and artillery, waiting for the assault. The fighting in [Japan](#) would have made the prior three-month blood bath at Okinawa, which formally ended just six weeks before Hiroshima, seem like child's play. The disaster at Okinawa cost the United States 50,000 casualties and 32 ships — the worst battle losses the American Navy suffered in the war. More than 250,000 Okinawans and Japanese soldiers were killed as well.

Just the street fighting to recapture Manila in the Philippines in early 1945 cost a quarter-million Filipino, Allied and Japanese lives. Three, the United States could have held off on using the bomb, postponed the invasion and simply kept firebombing [Japan](#) with its huge fleet of B-29 bombers. The planes soon would have been reinforced with thousands more American and British bombers freed from the end of World War II in Europe.

The napalming of Tokyo had already taken some 100,000 lives. With huge new Allied bomber fleets of 5,000 or more planes based on nearby Okinawa, the Japanese death toll would have soared to near a million. Four, the United States might have played rope-a-dope, stood down and let the Soviet Red Army overrun China, Korea and [Japan](#) itself — in the same fashion that the Russians months earlier had absorbed eastern Germany, the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

But the Soviet occupation of North Korea alone only led to more war in 1950. Had the Soviets grabbed more Japanese-occupied territory, more communist totalitarianism and conflict likely would have ensued, with no chance of a free and democratic postwar [Japan](#). Five, [Truman](#) could have dropped a demonstration bomb or two in Tokyo Bay to warn the Japanese government of their country's certain destruction if it continued the war.

But there was no guarantee that the novel weapons, especially the untested plutonium bomb, would work. A dud bomb or an unimpressive detonation at sea might have only emboldened the Japanese to continue the war. There were likely only three bombs ready in August. It was not clear when more would be available. So real worries arose that the Japanese might be unimpressed, ignore the warning and ride out the future attacks in hopes there were few additional bombs left.

In the cruel logic of existential war, demonstrating rather than using a new weapon can convey to autocratic belligerents hesitancy seen as weakness to be manipulated rather than as magnanimity to be reciprocated. By August 1945, six years after the start of World War II in Europe, some 70 million had died, including some 10 million killed by the Japanese military.

Millions more starved throughout Asia and China due to the destruction and famine unleashed by [Japan](#) — a brutal military empowered by millions of skilled civilian industrial workers. To Americans and most of the world 75 years ago, each day in early August 1945 that the Japanese war machine continued its work meant that thousands of Asian civilians and Allied soldiers would die.

In the terrible arithmetic of World War II, the idea that such a nightmare might end in a day or two was seen as saving millions of lives rather than gratuitously incinerating tens of thousands. It was in that bleak context that [Harry Truman](#) dropped the two bombs — opting for a terrible choice among even worse alternatives.

• **Victor Davis Hanson**, a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, is the author, most recently, of “The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern.”

75 Years Ago the Bomb Saved the World

<https://www.newsmax.com/lamontcolucci/hiroshima-nagasaki-okinawa-truman/2020/08/06/id/980866/>

By [Lamont Colucci](#) for Newsmax // Thursday, 06 August 2020 11:45 AM

My last column concerned the legacy of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences that were the final summits at the end of the Second World War.

The atomic bomb was integral to the outcome of those summits and completely altered both American foreign policy and American national security to this day. It has and is fashionable to decry President Harry Truman and his decision to use the atomic bomb against the Japanese empire during the Second World War. The decision has been mutated by the educational and media establishment, which seeks to cast the judgment as incompetence, but more likely, decries it as evil.

Like so much lost in America today, there is no appreciation for the history of this period, and more importantly, the existential struggle the United States faced against the Axis powers, and then immediately with the Soviet Union. In case some readers are unaware, the term "existential," when applied to foreign affairs literally, means that the civilization involved will cease to exist if the decisions are wrong.

It's probably difficult for those who possess little education, however much they might have on paper, to fully grasp the horrendous struggle America engaged in from 1941 to 1945. They are less likely to understand how close to defeat we came on several occasions. It's lost on many that had the United States lost a few pivotal battles like Normandy, and Midway, the entire outcome of the war would have changed.

It's also beyond the scope of many to fully grasp the casualty rates that America suffered. Contemporary Americans may be shocked to know that America suffered 6,000 casualties on the first day of Normandy, and 49,000 during the battle of Okinawa. One should pause here because part of Truman's decision was because of the casualty rates that came in from Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Truman's decision followed the absurd fighting in places like Iwo Jima and Okinawa and, more importantly, the projected casualties (as reported to Secretary of War Stimson) of Operations Olympic and Coronet (the projected conventional invasion of Japan) to be over 1 million Americans and 5 to 10 million Japanese. Other myths and fairytales have grown up surrounding the decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima on Aug. 6 and Nagasaki on Aug. 9.

We must keep in mind that the United States had three total bombs, one of which had already been used during the New Mexico test. The most common myths associated with Truman and this period need a quick dispelling: Truman had a committee considering alternatives, including using the bomb as a demonstration or continuing the much more horrific option of enforced starvation through a blockade. He also wanted to ensure that the targets made political and cultural sense, and therefore Tokyo and Kyoto were not ultimately targeted.

Truman's decision was also affected by the growing kamikaze casualties and the militarists of Japan, who clearly stated that it would be better for Japan to be destroyed than surrender. Finally, it must be remembered the Soviets invaded Japan in between the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The question of whether Japan today would have been better off being divided like Korea is one that is easy to answer with an emphatic no.

Can the Japanese people or we even conceive of what the horrors and genocide inside a Peoples Republic (North Japan) of Japan would have looked like? Finally, an item rarely discussed is that both the Germans and the Japanese were working on their own atomic bomb projects. We know the Soviets were stealing ours during our creation of it. It's worth reflecting on what kind of world would have existed if any of those powers would have had a first nuclear weapon, and worse, an atomic monopoly.

The decision to drop the atomic bombs was the hardest any president faced. Truman exhibited the first taste of his national security doctrine with this decision, and it was one that he neither relished nor regretted. The dropping of the bombs ended the war in the Pacific and saved millions of allied soldiers and Japanese civilian lives. It blunted the immediate Soviet threat and gave the West breathing room to deal with the looming Communist threat that sought world domination through the spread of evil, misery, and terror.

Dr. Lamont Colucci has experience as a diplomat with the U.S. Dept. of State and is today a Full Professor of Politics and Government at Ripon College. He has published two books as the sole author entitled "Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values After 9/11," and a two-volume series entitled "The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How they Shape our Present and Future." He was contributing author of two books entitled "The Day That Changed Everything: Looking at the Impact of 9/11 at the End of the Decade" and "Homeland Security and Intelligence." He is also Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, Senior Advisor in National Security for Contingent Security, Advisor on National Security and Foreign Affairs, to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and member of the National Task Force on National and Homeland Security. Find out more at lamontcolucci.org. Read Dr. Lamont Colucci's Reports — [More Here](#).

CONGRESSIONAL

By Susan Cornwell

HASC:

July 21: The House passed the HASC bill 295-125

July 1: HASC Completed Markup of FY21 HASC Bill

- ALL ICBM PEs at PB
- Total of \$731.6 B
 - Base Budget of \$662.6B
 - OCO Budget of \$69B

Smith Statement on Anthony Tata's Senate Confirmation Failure

August 2, 2020

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, today issued the following statement after reports that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper intends to announce that Brig. Gen. Anthony Tata (Ret.) will perform duties as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy despite his failure to receive Senate confirmation.

“Our system of checks and balances exists for a reason and the Senate’s role in the confirmation process for administration appointees ensures individuals at the highest levels of government are highly qualified. If an appointee cannot gain the support of the Senate, as is clearly the case with Tata, then the President should not put that person into an identical temporary role. This evasion of scrutiny makes our government less accountable and prioritizes loyalty over competence.

“The vacancies at the Department of Defense, which have now hit record highs under the Trump administration, should be filled through the existing nomination and confirmation process. If confirmations cannot be completed, the President must find new, qualified people who can win the support of the Senate. The record-breaking number of vacancies are currently limiting the ability of the Department to fulfill its myriad duties and missions, which poses a threat to our national security.”

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SASC:

July 23: The Senate passed the SASC bill 86 to 14

June 11: SASC completed markup of FY21 SASC Bill

- ALL ICBM PEs at PB
- Total of \$740.5 Billion.
 - Base Budget of \$636.4 billion for the Department of Defense and \$25.9 billion for national security programs within the Department of Energy.
 - OCO Budget of \$69 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations and \$8.15 billion for military construction

July 21: The House passed the HASC bill 295-125

July 1: HASC Completed Markup of FY21 HASC Bill

- ALL ICBM PEs at PB
- Total of \$731.6 B
 - Base Budget of \$662.6B
 - OCO Budget of \$69B

Committee Advances NORTHCOM, SPACECOM, Other Military Nominations

Tuesday, August 4, 2020

The Senate Armed Services Committee this morning voted by voice to report out a list of 99 pending military nominations in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Included in this list are the nominations of:

- Lieutenant General Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, to be general and Commander, United States Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command; and
- Lieutenant General James H. Dickinson, USA, to be general and Commander, United States Space Command.

All nominations were immediately reported to the floor following the Committee's action.

Senate Armed Services cancels hearing for controversial nominee

CQ NEWS Jul. 30, 2020 By Mark Satter, CQ

The Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday canceled at the last minute the nomination hearing for Anthony J. Tata, President Donald Trump's controversial pick to be the Pentagon's policy chief.

Tata, a retired Army brigadier general and regular contributor to Fox News, once called former President Barack Obama a "terrorist leader." It is unclear if the hearing will be rescheduled.

In a tweet, Senate Armed Services Chairman James M. Inhofe, R-Okla., said many lawmakers did not yet know enough about Tata to consider him for such a position at this time.

AUTHORIZATION CONFERENCE

November: Tentative timeframe for markup

HAC:

July 31: House passed the HAC bill as part of a spending bill package (217-197 vote)

- It included the spending bills for defense; labor, health and human services, and education; commerce, justice and science; energy and water; financial services and general government; and transportation and housing and urban development.
- From “The Hill” article dated 7/31/20 : More than half the funds in the bill were devoted to defense. It includes a 3 percent pay increase for troops, \$9.3 billion for 91 F-35 fighter jets, \$22.3 billion for nine new Navy ships and \$758 million to mitigate the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on subcontractors in the defense industrial base.
- The bill would also provide the Army with \$1 million for renaming assets named for Confederate figures and block funding for President Trump’s border wall.

July 14: The Full HAC passed the FY21 Defense Bill with a vote of 30-22

It provides \$694.6 billion in new discretionary spending authority for the Department of Defense for functions under the Defense Subcommittee’s jurisdiction, an increase of \$1.3 billion above the FY 2020 enacted level, and \$3.7 billion below the President’s budget request.

This includes \$626.2 billion in base funding, an increase of \$3.5 billion above the FY 2020 enacted level, and \$3.5 billion below the President’s request.

It also includes \$68.4 billion for OCO/GWOT funding in title IX, a decrease of \$2.2 billion below the FY 2020 enacted level, and \$200 million below the President’s request.

SAC:

TBD: Markup

APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE

TBD: Markup

July 8: HAC-D Marked up the FY21 Defense Bill

- GBSD lost \$60M
- Missile Repl/Eq Ballistic lost \$1.53M
- ICBM Fuze Mod lost \$3.458M
- MM Mods lost \$23.684M and transferred \$4.173 to another line

Minot Air Force Base is Cornerstone of U.S. National Defense

Minot Daily News Online (North Dakota), Aug. 1 | Sen. John Hoeven (R-ND)

Ambassador Marshall Billingslea’s visit to Minot Air Force Base this week demonstrates what Theodore Roosevelt meant when he said “speak softly and carry a big stick.” As the President’s Special Envoy for Arms Control, Ambassador Billingslea’s words as a diplomat carry great weight thanks to the awesome power of the missiles and bombers residing just northeast of Roosevelt’s North Dakota ranch. I spoke with Ambassador Billingslea prior to his visit to Minot to outline the vital importance of the nuclear forces at Minot Air Force. They provide the cornerstone of our national

defense, and also underwrite our nation's credibility when confronting our adversaries like China and Russia. The maintenance and modernization of our nuclear force must therefore remain a top priority.

The fall of the Soviet Union could have meant the end of nuclear competition with Russia. Instead, Russia has engaged in a multi-decade program to upgrade its weapons systems, develop new nuclear arms, and modernize its warheads. Meanwhile, the U.S. stopped upgrading its nuclear forces and now relies on equipment that has been extended well beyond its originally intended service life.

China presents another nuclear challenge. Beijing's claim that it has only a minimal deterrent is undermined by aggressive efforts to deploy a nuclear triad of missiles, bombers and submarines while disclosing few details about the size and posture of its arsenal. These forces will continue to become larger and more capable until Beijing demonstrates otherwise.

As a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, I am committed to strengthening our deterrent in the face of these growing challenges. This includes providing funding to replace our ICBM fleet and our nuclear cruise missiles, upgrading the B-52 with new engines and radars, and procuring modern helicopters to secure the missile fields. Also, through my position on the Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, I continue to support funding to keep our nuclear warheads safe and effective, including the warheads carried on our ICBMs and the nuclear cruise missiles at Minot Air Force Base.

President Trump has asked whether China and Russia would be willing to join negotiations that could improve stability and launch what Ambassador Billingslea has called "a new era" in arms control. Some in Washington, however, believe that pursuing an arms control agreement means we do not need to modernize our forces. This is short sighted. As he testified last week, efforts to reach an effective agreement go "hand-in-hand" with modernizing our nuclear forces. Upgraded nuclear forces can help ensure that Ambassador Billingslea is able to negotiate from a position of strength.

Credible and capable U.S. nuclear forces must be a top priority. We wish Ambassador Billingslea well as he begins new arms controls discussions and appreciate his visit to Minot Air Force Base to review our nuclear deterrent first-hand. Whether these negotiations are able to garner greater cooperation, we can remain proud that in defense of the American people and in support of our nation's diplomacy, Minot Air Force Base continues to carry the big stick.

--John Hoeven is serving as the senior U.S. Senator from North Dakota since 2011

House Passes \$18 billion NNSA Budget as Part of Appropriations Package

ExchangeMonitor.com, July 31 | Dan Leone

The House of Representatives on Friday passed a \$1.3 trillion "minibus" appropriations package that would give the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) \$2 billion less than it requested for fiscal 2021, even as the Senate has yet to release any spending bills and remains tangled up in controversy over a new COVID-19 relief bill.

Congress will have to untie the knot if it wishes to avoid a stopgap spending bill to keep the federal government operating after the current fiscal year ends on Sept. 30, in the walk-up to the Nov. 3 presidential and congressional elections.

The White House on Thursday threatened to veto the House's six-bill minibuss, which passed along an essentially party line of 217-197 and includes \$18 billion for the NNSA starting Oct. 1.

That is less than the roughly \$20 billion the Department of Energy agency says it needs this year to keep major infrastructure upgrades and nuclear-weapon modernization programs on track. However, it is over \$1 billion more than the agency will get if the Senate cannot start its own appropriations soon, and Congress must extend current spending levels with a continuing resolution to avoid a government shutdown.

The House minibuss denies NNSA funding to start developing a new submarine-launched ballistic-missile warhead, and shorts the agency's request for infrastructure upgrades, particularly improvements needed to produce new war-ready plutonium warhead cores this decade. It does provide the requested \$2.6 billion to four ongoing weapons-modernization programs: about 20% above the 2020 budget for those programs.

But Charles Verdon, the NNSA's deputy administrator for defense programs, said Wednesday that if the agency does not get its infrastructure-funding wish list in a 2021 budget bill, that "will impact ... acquisition schedules" of warheads that depend on infrastructure upgrades.

That notably applies to the W87-1 warhead for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent intercontinental ballistic missiles the Air Force wants to start deploying around 2030. The NNSA cannot start manufacturing that warhead without new pits that are supposed to be fastball in an expanded Los Alamos facility starting in 2024. However, Verdon has said the NNSA could adapt W87-0 warheads from the existing Minuteman III fleet, which the new missile will replace, if the agency has no W87-1 warheads by the time the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent is ready.

In its statement of administration policy, the White House said it strongly objected to the House's decision not to give NNSA all the funding it requested, and to a provision of the bill that would prohibit the civilian agency from collaborating with the joint DOE-Pentagon Nuclear Weapons Council on future budget requests.

It demonstrates again the White House's total buy in for the NNSA's revision of its medium-term funding needs.

As tallied this week in a new report from the Government Accountability Office, DOE now estimates it needs \$81 billion for nuclear modernization in the fiscal years 2021-2025 — \$15 billion more than it estimated in 2020 it would require for those five years.

"Such an increase may require cuts in other national defense programs to keep the defense budget within spending limits," the Government Accountability Office wrote.

There was no real floor debate about NNSA programs this week in the House. Lawmakers appeared to have largely exhausted that topic in committee. The single NNSA-related amendment that made it to the floor, a Republican proposal, failed on a voice vote, without much GOP protest.

The amendment, sponsored by Rep. Mike Turner (R-Ohio), the ranking member of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, would have erased language in the \$49 billion energy and water portion of the minibus forbidding the NNSA to use its 2021 budget to collaborate with the Pentagon on future budget requests for civilian weapons programs.

“I believe it would be better to improve the bill text ... rather than strike the language entirely,” Rep. Mike Simpson (R-Idaho), ranking member of the House Appropriations energy and water subcommittee, said of the Democratic-authored passage, and Turner’s effort to repeal it. Simpson has warned already this year that the language could prevent routine collaboration between the NNSA and the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council, which aims to keep civilian- and military-led nuclear weapons procurements in sync.

On the other hand, Simpson said he opposed giving the secretary of energy anything less than complete control over the NNSA’s budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee proposed giving the Pentagon veto power over the NNSA budget, but the proposal failed on the Senate floor.

Simpson, as the senior GOP member of the panel that writes the NNSA’s annual budget, was the only Republican to delve into the civilian weapons complex on the floor this week. He repeated that the Democrat majority’s bill, which he “reluctantly” opposed, short-changes the NNSA by withholding money for key infrastructure upgrades, including the plutonium pit processing facility planned at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

At Savannah River, the NNSA is converting the partially built Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility into a plant capable of casting new fissile warhead cores by 2030. The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico is also on the hook to produce new war-ready pits in an upgraded Plutonium Facility (PF-4), starting in 2024.

The House bill has less funding than requested by the NNSA for both pit plants, but the PF-4 upgrades would get more than double the funding they received for 2020 at around \$680 million, which is still 20% below the request. Pits at Savannah River, on the other hand, would get just over \$307 million, a 25% cut year over year and about 30% below the request. The NNSA has started construction on some supporting infrastructure upgrades for PF-4, but hasn’t expanded the Plutonium Facility itself. The Savannah River plant is still in the design phase.

Most of the gap between the House bill and the NNSA request is for upgrading and building nuclear-weapons production infrastructure. The difference between the agency’s ask for its infrastructure and operations account and the subcommittee’s recommendation was about \$1 billion. Pits alone would get \$600 million less than requested, but still almost \$300 million more than in 2020.

While the Senate Appropriations Committee has yet to produce any of the 12 annual spending bills for which it is responsible, the upper chamber typically waits until the House has passed spending bills before beginning debate on its own budget proposals. Besides the bundle of bills set for a vote today, the House passed a separate four- bill minibus last week.

This year, Senate appropriators have the added hurdle of taking the lead on another COVID-19 relief package, which flopped out of the gate this week when President Donald Trump called the \$1-trillion HEALS Act “semi-irrelevant.” That leaves the Senate Appropriations Committee potentially responsible for more COVID-19 work. Meanwhile, the House had at deadline finished 10 of the 12 yearly appropriations bills.

With Congress' August recess looming, and elections after that for some Republican senators running on President Trump's coattails, GOP leadership tried, and for now failed, to get control of the election-year aid bill by securing White House buy-in early and presenting Democrats with a bill that could be painted as the only one the president would sign.

AROUND THE WORLD



RUSSIA:

Any missile attacking Russia will be treated as nuclear one, response will follow - Russian General Staff

Interfax (Russia), Aug. 7 | Not Attributed

MOSCOW -- Russia will make use of its nuclear potential if its territory comes under a missile attack, representatives of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff said in an article published in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on Friday.

"Any attacking missile will be treated as a nuclear one. Information about such a missile's launch will automatically reach the military-political leadership of Russia, who, depending on the unfolding situation, will determine the scope of the nuclear forces' response," they said.

The article is authored by the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate department head Andrei Sterlin and leading research fellow from the General Staff Academy's Center for Military-Strategic Research Alexander Khryapin.

They believe that "the conditions for an adversary's use of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, for affecting critical facilities in Russia, for aggression involving conventional weapons should not evoke experts' questions."

"A concrete answer can be given to this question: what is the objective of aggression against Russia, which possesses considerable nuclear potential? The answer is to destroy Russia as a state," they said.

In its "foundations of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence", Russia set the 'red lines' that no one should cross, the authors of the article said.

"However, if a potential adversary decides to do this, the response will be devastating, beyond any doubt," they said.

After the abovementioned document was published in June 2020, "the conditions determining the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons were publicly declared for the first time," they said.

"The first condition is related to the arrival of credible information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and (or) its allies... The very fact of a ballistic missile's launch will be recorded by the missile attack warning system. At the same time, there will be no opportunity to establish whether it is nuclear or non-nuclear," they said.

Therefore, any attacking missile will be treated as a nuclear one, they said.

"At the same time, it is up to the military-political leadership of Russia to decide what specific measures will be taken in response (where, when, how many), depending on the situation," the authors of the article said US wants to sign nuclear non-proliferation agreement with Russia – Trump TASS (Russia), July 31 | Not Attributed

The United States is working on signing a new nuclear non-proliferation agreement with Russia, US President Donald Trump said.

"We are working with Russia right now on a non-proliferation agreement, nuclear non-proliferation. If we get something like that, it would be great," the US leader said on Friday, during a COVID-19 Response and Storm Preparedness roundtable in Florida.

Trump provided no further details about the agreement.

Russia and the United States held consultations on arms control and disarmament in July. Those meetings focused primarily on the fate of the bilateral New START treaty.

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) entered into force on February 5, 2011. The deal stipulates that seven years after it goes into effect, each party should have no more than a total of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers, as well as no more than 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and strategic bombers, and a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed missile launchers.

The document will remain in force for 10 years, until February 5, 2021, unless it is replaced before that date by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. It can also be extended for no longer than 5 years (that is, until 2026) by the parties' mutual consent.

Moscow has repeatedly called on Washington not to delay prolongation of the treaty it describes as a golden standard in the area of disarmament.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with The Financial Times in June that if this treaty ceased to exist there would be no other tools in the world containing the arms race.

Pentagon's publication about Russian missile defense developments is in line with disinformation campaign to discredit Russia Russian Foreign

Ministry Interfax (Russia), July 31 | Not Attributed

MOSCOW -- Moscow is viewing the material published on the Pentagon's website about Russian and Chinese developments in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defense as Washington's attempt to justify its own activities in a military buildup on a global scale, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

"We regard this publication as part of the orchestrated disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Russia. There are clear unscrupulous attempts to attribute to us some aggressive and dangerous intentions, this time in the area of anti-missile defense," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a commentary on its website on Friday.

The publication "is motivated by the desire of the Americans to justify their own large-scale and costly programs for creating and upgrading weapons and their plans to expand military presence around the globe," it said.

"Such bogus stories in the media traditionally lack any in-depth analysis or even a balanced reflection of the situation," the Foreign Ministry said, reminding that it was Washington that dismantled the 1972 ABM treaty, "destroying one of the pillars of the global strategic stability system," it said.

"The publication, of course, does not say a word about this. It is also silent on the fact of the U.S. implementing numerous destabilizing anti-missile projects," the Foreign Ministry said.

"U.S. military men are placing their strategic anti-missile infrastructure throughout the world, not only in the U.S. national territory, which ensures its global character. They also cherish the ideas of developing a space segment of their ABM [anti-ballistic missile] defense, virtually assuming a prospect of placing strike weapons in space," it said.

"It must be realized that the ABM architecture being built up by the United States is changing the strategic balance of forces in offensive arms, creating serious additional risks for global stability and contributing to the formation of dangerous preconditions for widening the spiral of the nuclear and space arms race," it said.

The Russian Foreign Ministry called on "Washington to take a responsible stance, to have a critical look at its anti-missile plans, the fulfillment of which will not consolidate the security of the U.S. or their allies." Moscow expressed readiness to "discuss the anti-missile issues with the U.S. within the framework of bilateral strategic dialogue."

Creation of Aerospace Forces enabled Russia to reinforce orbital group, boost missile defense potential – Shoigu

Interfax (Russia), July 31 | Not Attributed

MOSCOW -- The creation of the Aerospace Forces has allowed Russia to boost the potential of its missile and air defense, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said.

"The creation of the new branch of the Armed Forces allowed to reinforce the orbital group, to enhance the potential of the missile and air defense, and to supply advanced arms and hardware to the troops," Shoigu said in an order published in the Friday edition of the Russian Defense Ministry's Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper.

"Today, Aerospace Forces continue the military traditions of its predecessors, effectively combat international terrorism in the Syrian Arab Republic, persistently develop the aviation infrastructure, and reliably protect Russia's national interests in the aerospace sphere," the order said.

The Russian Aerospace Forces consist of the Air Force, the Space Force and the Missile and Air Defense Force.

The Russian Aerospace Forces will celebrate its fifth anniversary on August 1.

Be careful about US using 'invisible knife' to estrange China and Russia

Global Times (China), Aug. 7, Pg. 7 | Wang Xianju

The US and Russia finished their latest round of talks on arms control on July 30 in Vienna, with differences remaining. No consensus was reached on whether to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in February 2021.

Since the Trump administration came into power, the US' irresponsible behavior has reduced its international prestige. In order to maintain its hegemonic status in international affairs, Washington has tried all kinds of means.

First, the US has no moral standard and is unwilling to undertake international obligations. Washington has humiliated itself by its "America First" policy stance. Second, the so-called panaceas, such as democracy and human rights, have become less effective, as people have come to realize that the US holds double standards on many issues. Third, the US always flexes its muscles. It even threatens its allies with "security protection."

Although the US political elites have adopted a strategy of precaution and sanctions against Russia, its influence on Moscow in international politics does not seem to meet its expectations.

Washington is fully aware that there will be no easy bargains through talks with Moscow on issues such as arms control and extending the New START. Because the Russia clearly knows that politicians, military adventurers and financial oligarchs promoting the "America First" doctrine are not cooperating with Russia wholeheartedly.

Even if the treaty is extended, it will not change the US' strategy of developing and producing advanced and sophisticated weapons to safeguard its global military hegemony.

Therefore, while acting tough on Russia, the US is trying to seduce Russia to its side at the same time. Some Western media outlets and experts believe that it is better for the US to "exploit cracks in Russia-China relationship" to confront China and to avoid the formation of a China-Russia coalition against the US.

Recently, the US actively invited Russia to join the expanded version of the G7 and wanted to bring China into the negotiations on the New START between the US and Russia. These moves have been interpreted as the US temptation to estrange China and Russia.

However, China and Russia have been working together very closely at the central government level. This is proved by the fact that Moscow has rejected the baits of Washington several times.

The US has been using "soft power" and "smart power" to alienate China and Russia. This is why there has been a sharp increase of voices in the US media reports, and especially in social networks, in recent years trying to provoke China and Russia against each other and bad-mouth their relations.

In both China and Russia, there are some so-called analysts and observers who skillfully echo and collaborate with the war of words and "mind game" played by the US. Beijing and Moscow should pay close attention to these people.

Under this circumstance, it is significantly important to strengthen the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of China and Russia. They need to strengthen the social and public opinion foundation of their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.

China-Russia cultural and people-to-people cooperation is in urgent need of being strengthened by overcoming respective existing shortcomings as well as impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

By continuing to adopt good experiences and practices, such as "tourism year" and "year of culture," the two countries can also develop new communication mechanisms to fulfill the needs of evolving situations.

The purpose is to further improve mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries, cultivate talents familiar with each other's culture and language, and foster pragmatic cooperation and common development.

The Russia-China Friendship Association and the China-Russia Friendship Committee for Peace and Development, including the latter's subcommittees for culture, journalism, education, science and technology, can play a greater role in this regard.

--The author is deputy director and research fellow at the Renmin University of China - Russia St. Petersburg State University Russian Research Center

Russia Warns It Will See Any Incoming Missile as Nuclear

<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-08-07/russia-warns-it-will-see-any-incoming-missile-as-nuclear>

Russia's military is warning that Moscow will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation.

BY VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, Associated Press Wire Service Content // Aug. 7, 2020, at 7:22 a.m.

MOSCOW (AP) — Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation, the military warned in an article published Friday.

The harsh warning in the official military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) is directed at the United States, which has worked to develop long-range non-nuclear weapons. The article follows the publication in June of Russia's nuclear deterrent policy that envisages the use of atomic weapons in response to what could be a conventional strike targeting the nation's critical government and military infrastructure.

In the Krasnaya Zvezda article, senior officers of the Russian military's General Staff, Maj.-Gen. Andrei Sterlin and Col. Alexander Khryapin, noted that there will be no way to determine if an incoming ballistic missile is fitted with a nuclear or a conventional warhead, and so the military will see it as a nuclear attack. "Any attacking missile will be perceived as carrying a nuclear warhead," the article said.

"The information about the missile launch will be automatically relayed to the Russian military-political leadership, which will determine the scope of retaliatory action by nuclear forces depending on the evolving situation." The argument reflects Russia's longtime concerns about the development of weapons that could give Washington the capability to knock out key military assets and government facilities without resorting to atomic weapons.

In line with Russian military doctrine, the new nuclear deterrent policy reaffirmed that the country could use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or an aggression involving conventional weapons that "threatens the very existence of the state." The policy document offered a detailed description of situations that could trigger the use of nuclear weapons, including the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies.

In addition to that, the document states for the first time that Russia could use its nuclear arsenal if it receives "reliable information" about the launch of ballistic missiles targeting its territory or its allies and also in the case of "enemy impact on critically important government or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the incapacitation of which could result in the failure of retaliatory action of nuclear forces."

U.S.-Russia relations are at post-Cold War lows over the Ukrainian crisis, the accusations of Russian meddling in the U.S. 2016 presidential election and other differences. Russian officials have cast the U.S.-led missile defense program and its plans to put weapons in orbit as a top threat, arguing that the new capability could tempt Washington to strike Russia with impunity in the hope of fending off a retaliatory strike.

The Krasnaya Zvezda article emphasized that the publication of the new nuclear deterrent policy was intended to unambiguously explain what Russia sees as aggression. "Russia has designated the 'red lines' that we don't advise anyone to cross," it said. "If a potential adversary dares to do that, the answer will undoubtedly be devastating. The specifics of retaliatory action, such as where, when and how much will be determined by Russia's military-political leadership depending on the situation."



CHINA:

Chinese military: on guard for peace

Xinhua News Agency (China), Aug. 1 | Guo Yage

BEIJING -- On Aug. 1, 1927, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China was born out of a mission to seek national independence and liberation of the Chinese people.

More than nine decades have passed. And now the PLA, ever developing and modernizing, has not only been standing guard for the security and well-being of the Chinese people, but also contributing to regional and global peace and security.

First, the PLA has been firmly following a path of peaceful development. This determination can be well reflected in China's military expenditure.

China is now the world's second largest economy. Yet its defense spending has stayed at around 1.3 percent of its gross domestic product for many years, well below the world's average of 2.6 percent.

According to a draft budget report in late May, China will continue to lower its defense budget growth rate to 6.6 percent in 2020. Besides, a defense white paper issued July last year said the Chinese military has cut 300,000 personnel to keep the total active force at 2 million.

Second, the Chinese military has been faithfully implementing a defense-oriented policy. Far from bellicosity, China always tries to solve disputes and conflicts through dialogue and consultation, and deplors the use of offensive force.

In particular, the PLA has been committed to a self-defense nuclear strategy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.

Beijing has been widely recognized and praised for long maintaining its strong commitment to global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

Third, Chinese soldiers have repeatedly demonstrated to the world with tangible action that China has always been ready to do its part and help build this world into a more peaceful and better place.

Over the past 30 years, some 40,000 Chinese "blue helmets" have already been dispatched to conflict-affected countries and areas in 25 United Nations (UN) peace operations. China has become the largest troop contributor among the five permanent members of the Security Council and the second largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget.

The PLA has provided many other public security services, completing numerous long and short distance patrols and armed escorts, treating more than 230,000 patients, and offering anti-epidemic supplies to the military forces of over 20 countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

It has also joined other global partners to address unconventional security challenges and improve global security governance. China's recent accession to the Arms Trade Treaty is a case in point.

China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, safeguard world peace and promote common development, Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his 2020 New Year message.

Indeed, just as Xi has committed, the PLA, as the military of a responsible major country, will continue to do its best to make the world a better place not only for Chinese, but for all.

China can launch nuclear counterattacks within minutes – ex-soldier

Kyodo News (Japan), Aug. 2 | Not Attributed

BEIJING -- China can detect nuclear missiles launched from an enemy and counterattack using nuclear weapons within minutes before they land in the country, according to a paper written by a Chinese former military officer.

His remarks indicated China may have completed a missile attack early warning system while bolstering its nuclear programs, which could threaten the United States in security terms, foreign affairs experts said.

Development of the system requires advanced missile defense technologies integrating artificial satellites to detect missile launches with sea-based radar, they said.

China has apparently increased its missile defense capabilities in recent years, as the leadership of President Xi Jinping has stepped up efforts to give the nation's military "world-class" status by the mid-21st century.

The paper was written by Yang Chengjun, a Chinese specialist on nuclear missiles, who had long worked for the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, which has a nuclear missile unit.

In the paper, Yang also emphasized that China's nuclear capacity has become comprehensively comparable to those of the United States and Russia.

China has so far pledged to pursue the policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons" under any circumstances.

The basic principle of its nuclear strategy is that the country would counterattack with the nuclear weapons remaining without being destroyed after being hit by the enemy's nuclear weapons.



NORTH KOREA:

North Korea working on 'miniaturized' nuclear devices: UN report

<https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/north-korea-working-on-miniaturized-nuclear-devices-un-report/ar-BB17zejW>

By Richard Roth, for CNN // 2 days ago

North Korea is continuing work on its nuclear program and several countries believe Pyongyang has made gains in producing ballistic missiles with small nuclear devices attached, according to a confidential United Nations (UN) report, a UN diplomat told CNN.

The latest report was prepared by a UN-appointed independent panel of experts, who are charged with monitoring sanctions enforcement and efficacy. It says the unnamed countries believe [North Korea](#) "probably developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into the warheads of its ballistic missiles." The experts, who do not have access to North Korea, rely on UN countries to supply intelligence information.

The report, which concludes that North Korea remains in violation of UN sanctions, has been circulated to the 15-nation Security Council. UN diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity, provided different segments of the report to CNN. The report says "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is continuing its nuclear program, including the production of highly enriched uranium and construction of an experimental light water reactor.

A member state assessed that the DRPK is continuing production of nuclear weapons." The independent experts reported that one country, which wasn't named, claimed that North Korea "may seek to further develop miniaturization in order to allow incorporation of technological improvements such as penetration aid packages, or potentially to develop multiple warhead systems."

In addition, North Korea had vowed it destroyed or dismantled tunnels into a main nuclear site in May 2018. The report concludes that only tunnel entrances were known to have been destroyed and there is no indication of a comprehensive demolition. One country also assessed that North Korea could rebuild and reinstall within three months the infrastructure needed to support a nuclear test, the report said.

There hasn't been a known nuclear test inside North Korea since September 2017. The regime frequently praises its nuclear weapons as a block against outside aggression. On July 27, [Kim Jong-Un said](#) there will be no more war because the country has a nuclear deterrent. The report also noted that North Korea had not stopped violations highlighted in [previous reports](#).

A UN report last year concluded North Korea generated around \$2 billion using cyberattacks to plunder banks and cryptocurrency exchanges. The summary of that report indicated North Korea is probing Security Council countries in cyberattacks. Though not responding directly to the 2020 report, US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft told a gathering at the Aspen Institute on Tuesday that US policy toward Pyongyang hasn't changed

and that the US still seeks denuclearization in the region. "It is something that we keep a very close eye on," she said.

Ri Pyong Chol: Kim's New Right Hand Man?

<https://www.38north.org/2020/08/mgarlauskas080520/>

BY: [MARKUS V. GARLAUSKAS](#) for .38 North // AUGUST 5, 2020

On July 8, The Korea Herald [proclaimed](#) that Ri Pyong Chol had risen to “number five” in North Korea’s hierarchy, based on official photographs of his placement at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun memorial tribute to Kim Il Sung. While it is generally not advisable to put too much stock in the changing positions and protocol order of North Korea’s senior officials, the rise of Ri Pyong Chol is worth further analysis. Given Kim Jong Un’s consolidation of authority over Party and state, a decision to elevate a key subordinate like Ri could provide insights into Kim’s plans and priorities. Similarly, decisions to highlight or quote a particular top official other than Kim Jong Un in state media outlets can also provide deeper insights into the regime’s internal and external signaling. As a result, Ri Pyong Chol’s new status and his history merit a deeper look—particularly due to his close association with North Korea’s strategic weapons programs.

At the Right Hand of Kim

The Kumsusan visit was not the first time Ri Pyong Chol has been shown alongside Kim Jong Un in state media. Most recently, Ri was shown sitting at Kim’s right hand in unusual state media coverage of the small [“closed-door” meeting](#) of the Central Military Commission (CMC) on July 18. This meeting followed a much [larger session](#) with a broad cross-section of military and defense industry leaders, where Ri was shown in photos and video as the only other official on stage with Kim—elevated over an audience of dozens of top generals and other senior officials. He was also the only participant mentioned by name in the KCNA report of these events besides Kim himself, further indicating that Ri’s leadership role as vice chairman clearly set him above and apart from the other members of the CMC.[\[1\]](#)

However, there is more about Ri’s role on the CMC than just the optics from July 18 that indicate his importance in the regime hierarchy. Ri was just named as CMC vice chairman at its May meeting, making the July session not only his first formal CMC meeting in this new capacity, but also the first formal CMC meeting with a vice chairman at all, since the post was apparently left in abeyance in 2016.[\[2\]](#) The reestablishment of this position apparently places Ri in a critical role, both in framing the collective advice of CMC members to Kim and in overseeing execution of guidance from Kim to CMC officials. It also means Ri has essentially been positioned over the leaders of the General Staff Department and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and their political guidance apparatus, as well as various defense industry organizations.

This new role, particularly when combined with his front-rank appearance at Kumsusan, is a strong indicator of Ri’s prestige, his favor with Kim and his importance within the regime. The CMC vice chairman position has an auspicious and upwardly mobile history. Kim Jong Un himself held the position as his primary post for a little over a year until his father’s death, while he was in the final stages of preparing to assume leadership of North Korea. Choe Ryong Hae later held the position before he went on to assume the two highest posts in the country behind Kim Jong Un—first vice chairman of the State Affairs Commission and president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly.

Launched to Senior Leadership Under Kim Jong II

Ri Pyong Chol initially rose to senior-level positions and media attention under Kim Jong Il. In 2008, he took command of the Korean People's Army Air Force and was mentioned by KCNA several times in this capacity, especially for traveling to China and Cuba at the head of military delegations.^[3] In 2010, he hit three new career milestones: in April, he was promoted to General; and in September he was named a member of the CMC and the Korean Workers' Party's (KWP) Central Committee.^[4] Despite these milestones, further success was not guaranteed. By the time Kim Jong Il died, Ri had not advanced beyond head of the Air Force after four years in the position. While he could have easily faded from the scene not long after the transition of leadership, Ri's career would soon be dramatically enhanced.

Rising Trajectory Under Kim Jong Un

One of Kim Jong Un's first military site visits after assuming power was to an Air Force unit, where he was greeted by Ri.^[5] Ri was periodically mentioned in state media over the next two years, but his public profile remained unremarkable. However, after the purge of Jang Song Thaek in December 2013 and during the reshuffling that followed, Ri's influence grew quickly. By September 2014, Ri was named to the National Defense Commission, then the highest body of authority in North Korea, a sign that he had probably obtained Kim Jong Un's trust and favor.^[6] He turned over the Air Force to a successor by December of 2014 to assume a senior Party position.^[7]

Based on his duties in the following years, outside media and analysts concluded that his new title of first vice director meant he had become number two within the Munitions Industry Department (MID), the organization responsible for North Korea's ballistic missile development.^[8] Michael Madden, of 38 North's affiliate North Korea Leadership Watch, and retired United States Forces Korea Strategy Chief Robert Collins have also suggested that he gained a concurrent vice directorship in the Party Organization and Guidance Department (OGD)—a very influential, if shadowy, position in the Party which would help further explain his subsequent rise.^[9]

Enthusiastically Embraced by the Supreme Leader, Until Pause in Weapons Testing

Though we may never know exactly what led to Ri's elevation in 2014, his frequent and close interactions with Kim Jong Un are probably no coincidence. If Western media reports are to be believed that Ri is the grandfather or grand-uncle of Kim's wife Ri Sol Ju, Kim and Ri became relations by marriage in 2009. Ri's membership in the CMC also meant that Kim would have overseen him there beginning in 2010.

Ri rocketed to an even higher level of prominence in state media during his notably warm personal interactions with Kim as weapons testing accelerated from 2015 to 2017. Ri seemed to be getting some of the credit from Kim Jong Un for these tests. Korean Central Television (KCTV) and showed Kim enthusiastically hugging Ri after at least one such launch in 2016, for instance, and they were shown whispering to each other during a celebration following North Korea's first ICBM test in July 2017.

However, once Kim shifted to diplomatic engagement rather than weapons testing at the end of 2017, Ri seemed to virtually disappear—with only enough appearances in 2018 to prove he had not been purged. He was overshadowed by others like Kim Yong Chol and Kim Yo Jong, who were at the forefront of diplomatic efforts with South Korea and the US.

Ri Rises to Forefront by 2020

Just weeks after Kim failed to secure a deal at the summit in Hanoi, Ri began to regain visibility in North Korean media as missile launches resumed in May 2019. Ri's prominence and proximity to Kim in state media grew over the following months, and he even appeared to be the senior official

presiding in Kim’s absence over the October 2019 test of the new [Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile](#) (SLBM). In 2020, Ri’s status has been on the rise again. On January 1, a Party Central Committee meeting readout reported that Kim Jong Un had declared North Korea was no longer bound by commitments to limit its weapons testing, ordered strategic weapons development to push forward, and warned that the world would soon witness a new North Korean strategic weapon.[\[10\]](#)

The same readout announced three major promotions for Ri, elevating his authority and status to deliver on these statements. Ri was named a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Committee, and was promoted to department head—presumably moving him up to the top position in the MID. By the end of March, Ri had been entrusted to oversee a launch and give guidance afterward, playing a role in the launch, according to state media accounts, normally reserved for Kim himself.[\[11\]](#) Ri was named to the State Affairs Commission weeks later, officially placing him on the new highest ruling body of North Korea.[\[12\]](#) In May, he was named vice chairman of the CMC. All this set the stage for his July 2020 appearances as “number five” at Kumsusan, and at Kim’s right hand in the CMC meetings.

Overseeing a New Strategic Weapon?

It is very unlikely that Kim re-created the role of the CMC vice chairman, and appointed an official with extensive experience overseeing the development, testing and fielding of new strategic weapons, without a plan in mind. Since January, the Kim regime has been publicly signaling its intention to not only continue producing existing strategic weapons systems, but to unveil and test new ones; the rise of Ri Pyong Chol at the same time reinforces that this is more than mere rhetoric. If “personnel are policy” in Pyongyang, then Ri’s latest promotions indicate the regime’s policy is to push forward with the production, development and testing of strategic weapons. If Kim makes the decision to deliver on his warning by unveiling a new strategic weapon, Ri is likely to be responsible for preparing and directing the operation, whether this is through a parade, a realistic test launch or something in between.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other US Government agency.



SOUTH KOREA:

NSTR



IRAN:

Iran rules out attack as cause of nuclear site incident

Agence France-Presse, July 31 | Not Attributed

A member of an influential Iranian security body said on Friday it had ruled out drone or missile attacks as the cause of an incident at a nuclear site earlier this month.

The incident occurred at a warehouse under construction at the Natanz nuclear complex in central Iran on July 2, but caused no casualties or radioactive pollution, according to Iran's nuclear body.

"What is certain is that in our view, a drone, missile, bomb or rocket attack is not the case," ISNA news agency quoted Mojtaba Zolnour, head of parliament's national security and foreign affairs committee, as saying.

"There are traces of an explosion from elements on the inside (of the building) but since investigations are ongoing, I will not disclose the details," he added.

Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced on July 3 that the "cause of the accident" at Natanz had been "accurately determined" but declined to release details, citing security reasons.

State news agency IRNA at the time published an editorial warning Iran's arch-foes against hostile actions.

It said Israeli social media accounts had claimed the Jewish state was behind the incident, without identifying the accounts.

A spokesman for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation has acknowledged that the incident caused "significant financial damage" and that the building had been designed to produce "advanced centrifuges."

Tehran announced in May last year it would progressively suspend certain commitments under a 2015 landmark nuclear deal with major powers.

The United States unilaterally abandoned the accord in 2018.

Iran restarted enriching uranium at Natanz last September, despite having agreed under the accord to put such activities there on hold.

Tehran has always denied its nuclear programme has any military dimension.

Iran Will Expand Nuclear Program and Won't Talk to U.S., Ayatollah Says

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/world/asia/iran-khamenei-us-sanctions.html>

In a televised speech, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, said that negotiating with Washington over his country's nuclear program would only help President Trump get re-elected.

By Farnaz Fassihi for the NY Times // Aug. 1, 2020

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has said in a televised address that Iran will expand its nuclear program and will not negotiate with the United States, doubling down on his defiance of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy.

In a Friday speech for the Eid al-Adha holiday, Ayatollah Khamenei said that entering talks with Washington over Iran's nuclear program, as President Trump has urged Tehran to do, would only improve Mr. Trump's chances of being re-elected in November. That, the ayatollah said, was Mr. Trump's reason for suggesting such talks in the first place. "He is going to benefit from negotiations," Ayatollah Khamenei said.

"This old man who is in charge in America apparently used negotiations with North Korea as propaganda," he added — a reference to Mr. Trump's high-profile nuclear diplomacy on another front, which to date has been mostly fruitless. Ayatollah Khamenei also said that Iran would maintain its close alliances with militia groups in the region that it uses as proxies, defying another demand from the Trump administration.

The Iranian leader was not the first to connect the possibility of talks with the United States to the presidential election. Last month, Mr. Trump said on Twitter that Iran could make a better deal if it did so before November. "Don't wait until after U.S. Election to make the Big deal," he wrote. "I'm going to win. You'll make a better deal now!" The United States has continued to tighten sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, which have had a crippling effect on the Middle Eastern country's economy.

On Thursday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the State Department would expand the sanctions to cover 22 materials believed to be used in Iran's nuclear, military and ballistic missile programs. Ayatollah Khamenei said that Iran would not try to negotiate its way out of the sanctions and that it would be better off relying on its own industrial development.

He said the Americans were targeting his country's economy in the hope that Iranians would rise up against their government, which the ayatollah dismissed as "pipe dreams." Mr. Khamenei said that developing the nuclear program was an absolute necessity for Iran's future. He dismissed the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and several world powers, which Mr. Trump abandoned in 2018, as "very damaging," saying that Iran had suffered economic setbacks because of it.

Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is meant exclusively for peaceful purposes, but the United States and other countries believe it is pursuing the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. The Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, who was in charge of the negotiations for Iran, said as recently as last month in Parliament that the negotiating team had Ayatollah Khamenei's full support and blessing to reach a deal.

The ayatollah, who recently directed his closest economic advisers to cement a 25-year military and economic partnership with China, said in his speech that European countries involved in the nuclear deal were unreliable, and that their attempts to salvage the pact — such as creating a secure financial channel so that Iran could maintain a limited amount of trade — were "useless games."

Some Iranian officials and analysts have said that Iran's strategy was to wait out the remainder of Mr. Trump's term in hopes of a Democratic victory that could revive the deal, which was reached under President Barack Obama. "Khamenei has always believed that accommodating to one U.S. demand would bring about another demand and another," said Sina Azodi, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. "For him, every solution would bring about another problem."

But analysts, entrepreneurs and businessmen inside Iran have warned that the economy risks collapse if the current situation continues. Since the United States pulled out of the nuclear deal in May 2018, Iran's currency has dropped sharply and inflation has surged. The government said it faced a budget deficit of nearly 30 percent this fiscal year. Oil sales have plummeted from 2.5 million barrels a day to about 300,000, nearly eliminating Iran from the global crude oil market.



INDIA:

India, China struggle to resolve border disputes

<https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/india-china-struggle-to-resolve-border-disputes/>

New Delhi pushes back against Beijing's attempts to extinguish its claims on territories occupied by the PLA

By SUMIT SHARMA for Asia Times // JULY 31, 2020

India and China have failed to resolve key disputes over the Ladakh border clashes, despite half a dozen rounds of negotiations over the past two months.

China's ambassador to India said in New Delhi Friday that the situation on the ground is de-escalating and "the temperature is coming down." However, India has pushed back against what it says are China's attempts to extinguish its claims on the territories occupied by Beijing's forces since April. China has highlighted India's critical dependence on it for components used to make products ranging from computers to motorcycles. India is dissatisfied and disappointed with the talks over several areas of its northernmost tip.

"With the joint efforts of both sides, the border troops have disengaged in most localities," Ambassador Sun Weidong said. His comments, made just days before the next round of talks between senior commanders, were challenged by India's Ministry of External Affairs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has been under fire from opposition leaders and strategic affairs experts for its inability to push back the intruders.

"There has been some progress made towards this objective but the disengagement process has as yet not been completed," said Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Anurag Srivastava. "Senior commanders of the two sides will be meeting in the near future to work out steps in this regard." India has been seeking the withdrawal of Chinese troops that encroached on the crucial Galwan Valley area that overlooks India's military highway, which is critical for supplying materiel to northern border areas. India says China has also occupied strategic areas eight kilometers inside Indian territory near Pangong Lake and Hot Springs, and the Depsang Plains in the north.

"We expect that the Chinese side will sincerely work with us for complete disengagement and de-escalation and full restoration of peace and tranquility in the border areas at the earliest as agreed to by the special representatives," said Srivastava. "The maintenance of peace and tranquility

in the border areas is the basis of our bilateral relationship.” China’s incursions have sparked intense anger in India, prompting it to increase its defense budget, ordering more fighter jets and seeking early deliveries of jets and missiles already ordered.

In addition to becoming an active participant in naval exercises with the United States, India is increasing its naval presence across the Indian Ocean. Strategic affairs experts are calling for a review of relations with China, especially India’s recognition of Beijing’s One-China policy. Ambassador Sun said, “There has been an argument in Indian public opinion on the boundary question, which worries me, suggesting the Indian government adjust its policy towards China, and change its stance on issues related to Taiwan, Xizang, Hong Kong and the South China Sea to put pressure on China.

“I want to point out emphatically that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Xizang affairs are totally China’s internal affairs and bear on China’s sovereignty and security. While China doesn’t interfere in other country’s domestic affairs, it allows no external interference and never trades its core interests either.” On the economic and commercial front, India initially banned 59 Chinese apps and later another 47 apps.

It increased restrictions on Chinese companies selling goods and services to Indian state-run companies and projects. Chinese companies are also large investors in Indian start-ups. India’s trade with China rose 32 times to almost \$100 billion over the past two decades. China was one of the biggest trading partners and India depended on it for several components and parts critically needed for its own economy and exports, the ambassador said.

“Globalization has deepened the interconnection between countries into the ‘capillaries’,” said Sun. “Whether you want it or not, the trend is difficult to reverse. Both China and India have been deeply embedded in the global industrial chain and supply chain.” In a veiled warning to its South Asian neighbor, the Chinese ambassador said a forced decoupling of the Chinese and Indian economies would go against the global trend and only lead to a “lose-lose” outcome.

“Chinese and Indian economies are interwoven and interdependent,” he said. “According to local statistics in India, in 2018-2019, 92% of Indian computers, 82% of TVs, 80% of optical fibers, 85% of motorcycle components are imported from China.”



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
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